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A GATE FOREVER CLOSED? RETIRING
IMMIGRATION LAW’S POST-DEPARTURE BAR
Jonathan H. Ross*
Immigration law’s “post-departure bar” destroys the jurisdiction of
either an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals to hear a
motion to reopen or reconsider filed by an alien who is no longer physically
within the country. This Note examines the current conflict between the
federal circuits regarding the post-departure bar and why the circuits that
have decided to strike down the bar in the cases before them have ruled in
line with certain trends present in recent Supreme Court immigration cases.
Conflict between the circuits has arisen because the governing statute,
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
was enacted without reference to the bar, which had been in place before
the Act’s passage. In that statutory silence, the Attorney General
promulgated regulations intended to reestablish the bar. In recent years,
circuits have taken various positions on the bar’s validity. Many have
struck the bar down on the basis of either Chevron deference or the
grounds outlined in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, which bars an agency from limiting its jurisdiction
in certain situations. Still, other circuits have upheld the bar by using
Chevron to conclude that deference to the agency is proper.
This Note suggests that the circuits that have struck down the bar are in
line with prevailing trends in recent immigration cases decided by the
Supreme Court. Further, this Note argues that it does not matter whether a
circuit court relies upon Chevron or Union Pacific to strike down the bar,
as the use of either precedent to attack the bar serves these trends, and is
consistent with the overall direction of American immigration law.
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INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TWO IMMIGRANTS
Two aliens live and work in the United States, one in Maryland, and the
other in Massachusetts. Both came to the United States illegally with their
parents as young children, and both have resided in the country for several
decades. Both aliens eventually married American citizens, had children,
and have been working steady jobs to support those families for a number
of years. However, neither alien formally completed the process to attain
lawful permanent resident status and subsequent citizenship following their
marriage. Both aliens became tangentially involved in schemes to receive
stolen credit cards, and both were wrongfully convicted. Subsequently,
while serving their jail sentence they are issued Notices to Appear before an
immigration judge (IJ) in order to defend against their potential removal
from the United States on the basis of their criminal conviction for fraud.
Both are resident aliens who mistakenly fell in with the wrong crowds.
Because they never went through the formal citizenship process, both may
now have to leave their homes and families behind in America, or uproot
them to a foreign land. In each case, the IJ orders removal, and after failing
to convince the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to reverse the order
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during their appeals process, both aliens are removed from America to their
countries of origin. While overseas in their homelands, both file for vacatur
of their conviction and are successful. Innocent in the eyes of the criminal
justice system, both file motions to reopen with the BIA.1
Here, the fortunes of the two aliens diverge based on the jurisdiction in
which each went through the removal process. The BIA may grant the
motion for the alien who resided in Maryland and may even overturn the
order for removal. In this scenario, the immigration court falls within the
purview of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in William v. Gonzales,2 which struck
down the regulatory “post-departure” bar.3 The immigrant residing in
Massachusetts will not be so lucky. Instead, due to the regulatory “postdeparture” bar4 promulgated by the Attorney General, the BIA will be
deprived of jurisdiction to even hear the motion.5
The current state of the post-departure bar is in flux, as the circuit courts
have taken divergent positions on its continuing validity.6 In some circuits,
like the Fourth, the post-departure bar is considered invalid.7 These courts
invalidate the bar either through applying the framework of Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,8 or the principles of Union
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.9
Meanwhile, in other circuits, such as the First, the bar still stands.10
Part I gives an overview of the state of the post-departure bar. Part II
then examines the conflict and how the circuits have ruled on the bar’s
validity. Finally, Part III argues that it ultimately does not matter which
ground reverses the bar, because either of the two major tools serves the
norms that the Supreme Court has relied upon. This comparison shows that
the lifting of the post-departure bar is in line with the overall direction of
the law.
I. THE POST-DEPARTURE BAR AND THE REGULATORY AND
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF DEPORTATION
Before diving into the array of cases that have been brought before the
circuit courts regarding the post-departure bar’s validity, this Note
considers the background of the bar itself and its place in the overall context
of American immigration law. This analysis begins in Part I.A by
1. See infra Part I.A.1.
2. 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007).
3. See id. at 333–34; infra notes 222–40.
4. This Note refers to the regulatory “post-departure” bar. However, some courts and
other scholarship refer to this bar just as the departure bar. I have chosen to use the term
“post-departure” for clarity, as the bar comes into effect after an alien’s departure from the
United States.
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra note 3.
8. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
9. 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009).
10. See infra notes 263–75.
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discussing motions to reopen and reconsider in general, before moving into
a discussion of the bar itself and its pre-1996 history. Next, Part I.B
discusses the history of the bar as it evolved from the common law to its
modern form through repeated legislation and executive interpretation of
that legislation. Then, Part I.C examines how removal proceedings operate
and the types of situations where the post-departure bar comes into play.
Part I.D introduces the tools that the circuit courts have used to dismantle
the bar: Chevron and Union Pacific. Finally, Part I.E details recent
Supreme Court immigration decisions and the norms that the Court has
relied on.
A. The Post-departure Bar
The post-departure bar is a prohibition on the right of an alien to file a
motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider after physically leaving the
borders of the United States.11 Essentially, the bar operates to deprive
either the immigration court or the BIA of taking jurisdiction to consider
the motion, as the alien, by having left the United States, is deemed to have
“passed beyond” the agency’s control.12
1. Motions to Reopen
A motion to reopen is “a form of procedural relief that ‘asks the Board to
change its decision in light of newly discovered evidence or a change in
circumstances since the hearing.’”13 Filing such motions will not
automatically stay a removal order.14 An IJ will not grant a motion to
reopen unless the IJ is satisfied that the evidence being offered is material,
previously unavailable, and could not have been discovered or presented at
the prior hearing.15
Motions to reopen were initially created by federal judges before official
codification.16 For example, a motion to reopen had appeared earlier in a
1916 district court case.17 After much evolution, the current statutory
11. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (2011) (applying to motions filed with the BIA). “A motion to
reopen or a motion to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the
subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings subsequent to his or her departure
from the United States.” Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (governing motions filed with an IJ).
12. See In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 656 (B.I.A. 2008) (“Removed
aliens have, by virtue of their departure, literally passed beyond our aid.”).
13. Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2315 (2008) (quoting 1 CHARLES GORDON,
STANLEY MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 3.05[8][c] (rev. ed. 2012)). See generally THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET
AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 1075–77 (6th ed. 2008)
(discussing motions to reopen and reconsider).
14. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(f). An exception is if removal is ordered in absentia. See 8
C.F.R. §§ 1003.23(b)(4)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A).
15. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3). These motions are disfavored due to the strong public
interest in concluding litigation. See Tawadrous v. Holder, 565 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2009).
16. See Dada, 128 S. Ct. at 2315.
17. See id. (citing Ex parte Chan Shee, 236 F. 579 (N.D. Cal. 1916)). “The motion must
state the new facts that will be proven at the hearing if the motion is granted . . . . [and] must
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scheme as enacted by Congress provides the right to file such motions,
while placing some strict time limits on filing, along with exceptions to the
rule.18
2. Motions to Reconsider
Alternatively, a motion to reconsider asks the BIA or an IJ to review an
error made in its legal or factual analysis of a particular case.19 Essentially,
“[a] motion to reconsider asks that a decision be reexamined in light of
additional legal arguments . . . while a motion to reopen asks for
reconsideration on the basis of facts or evidence not available at the time of
the original decision.”20 Together, these two motions have been statutorily
codified as part of our immigration adjudication and enforcement scheme,
albeit with some limitations on use.
3. The Post-departure Bar Generally
The post-departure bar consists of two regulations promulgated by the
Attorney General.21 Those regulations bar motions to reopen or reconsider
filed before either the IJ or the BIA where the individual has already
departed from the United States.22 While these two regulations have
engendered a large amount of litigation in recent years,23 the prospect of an
alien’s motion to reopen or reconsider being barred post-departure has not
always been so controversial, as the bar existed for years before the passage
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA).24
4. 1952–1990: Beginnings of the Bar
Regulations governing the agency’s lack of jurisdiction over postdeparture motions were first promulgated in 1952, following passage of the
Shortly after these
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA).25
regulations were passed, the BIA determined that they were a jurisdictional
limitation, thus constitutionally depriving the BIA of power to hear such

be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.” 5 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY
MAILMAN, STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR & RONALD Y. WADA, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE,
§ 64.03[4][b] (rev. ed. 2012) (citations omitted).
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See 1 GORDON, MAILMAN, YALE-LOEHR & WADA, supra note 17, § 3.05 [8][b].
20. Patel v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 610, 612 (7th Cir. 2004).
21. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1) (2011).
22. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d) (applying to motions filed with the BIA), 1003.23(b)(1)
(governing motions filed with an IJ).
23. See infra Part II.
24. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996); see also infra Part I.A.4–5.
25. See Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 173 (1952). The INA authorized the Attorney
General to promulgate regulations in order to properly administer and enforce the new
legislation. See generally Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 655–58 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing
the history of the post-departure bar and other related regulations).
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motions.26 These regulations did not stay untouched for long. In 1958,
Congress revised them, granting the BIA sua sponte authority to reconsider
or reopen decisions on its own determination for those who had departed.27
Three years later, when Congress amended the INA to create a regime for
judicial review of BIA decisions,28 the statute governing judicial review
included a post-departure bar.29 This regulatory and statutory scheme
prevailed for nearly thirty years.
5. 1990: The Winds of Change Begin to Blow
The Immigration Act of 199030 ordered the Attorney General to impose
some limitations on the use of motions to reopen and reconsider. These
included “a limitation on the number of such motions and a maximum time
period for the filing of such motions.”31 This was a reversal from the prior
regime, which was relatively free of procedural restrictions (beyond the
post-departure bar itself).32
The idea was that such limitations would help reduce excessive motion
practice by aliens facing removal, who would file successive motions to
delay their removal.33 On this theory, it seems that it would be especially
disruptive to allow such motions when an alien had already departed the
country.
Ultimately, the Attorney General issued new regulations to act as a
stopgap against this purported abuse.34 The new rule was that “[i]n most
instances, the motion to reopen must be filed not later than 90 days after the
date on which the final administrative decision was rendered.”35
Additionally, an alien was limited to one motion to reconsider, filed up to
thirty days after a final decision.36 These regulations were instituted despite

26. See In re G— y B—, 6 I. & N. Dec. 159, 159–60 (B.I.A. 1954) (“We believe we are
without jurisdiction to act on the motion . . . . In law there exists no decision of this Board in
this case. It follows that we are without jurisdiction to entertain a motion to reconsider
. . . .”).
27. See Miscellaneous Amendments to Chapter, 23 Fed. Reg. 9115, 9117–19 (Nov. 26,
1958).
28. See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 650 (1961).
29. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (2006) (“An order of deportation or of exclusion shall not
be reviewed by any court if the alien . . . has departed from the United States . . . .”)
(repealed 1996).
30. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
31. Id.
32. See Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 656–57 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing how in 1990
aliens were permitted to file an unlimited number of motions to reopen with no time
limitations).
33. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992) (“[I]n a deportation proceeding . . . every
delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to remain in the
United States.”).
34. See Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration
Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,901, 18,905 (Apr. 29, 1996).
35. Id. at 18,900.
36. See id.
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doubts expressed by the Attorney General regarding their necessity.37 A
prominent exception to these rules that allowed some flexibility when
outside the outlined limits was the sua sponte authority of the IJ and the
BIA to reopen a proceeding.38
Shortly after the Attorney General promulgated the regulations enforcing
the 1990 Amendments, Congress decided to codify many of them in a new
piece of legislation.39 That codification is part of a broader series of
immigration reforms within IIRIRA.40
B. Opening Up a Can of Worms: IIRIRA
IIRIRA was a comprehensive change to U.S. immigration law.41 At the
time, there was a perceived problem of an ever-growing number of
undocumented immigrants crossing into the United States and abusing the
immigration system in order to stay in the country.42
IIRIRA bolstered immigration law enforcement in several ways. For
example, IIRIRA’s provisions included vastly increasing the number of
Border Patrol agents in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),43
37. See Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2315 (2008) (“The Attorney General found
little evidence of abuse . . . .”). The Attorney General viewed such restrictions as an
effective disincentive against the use of motions in bad faith. Id.
38. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1) (2011); see also Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d
650, 657 (2d. Cir. 2010) (“Chief among these mechanisms were the regulations providing
authority to both an IJ and the BIA to reopen, sua sponte . . . .”).
39. See infra Part I.B.
40. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-46, 3009-587 (1996).
41. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
42. See 142 CONG. REC. 5303 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde). Representative Hyde
stated:
Today, undocumented aliens surreptitiously cross our border with impunity. Still
others enter as nonimmigrants with temporary legal status, but often stay on
indefinitely and illegally. The INS administrative and adjudicatory processes are a
confusing, inefficient bureaucratic maze, resulting in crippling delays in
decisionmaking. The easy availability of fraudulent documents frustrates honest
employers, who seek to prevent the employment of persons not authorized to work
in the United States. Unfortunately, the result of illicit job prospects only serves as
a magnet to further illegal immigration. Clearly, we face a multifaceted
breakdown of immigration law enforcement that requires our urgent attention.
Id.; see also David Johnston, Government Is Quickly Using Power of New Immigration Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, at A20. The article notes:
The new law limiting immigrants’ access to the courts reflects a harsh reality:
that the political furor in Congress and the Administration about illegal
immigration and criminal aliens has found its way into law.
....
Lawmakers who supported the bill said it was necessary to unclog an
immigration system swamped with lawsuits by people without citizenship or
residency rights who used the Federal courts to prolong their stays in the United
States or even gain a foothold on American citizenship.
Id.
43. See Pub. L. 104-208, div. C, §§ 101(a)–(b), 304, 110 Stat. 3009-553–54 (1996)
(calling for the hiring of a minimum of 1,000 new agents every year for the next five years
and a maximum of 300 new support personnel each year).
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hiring more Assistant U.S. Attorneys to prosecute those who harbor or
bring illegal aliens across borders,44 and increasing civil penalties on those
who enter the country illegally.45
More importantly for the purposes of this Note, IIRIRA also included
several provisions that changed some of the opportunities for aliens to
access the federal courts to defend against removal.46 Essentially, IIRIRA
restricted judicial review of removal orders in some cases and limited the
granting of relief from a removal order.47 For example, IIRIRA superseded
the former codifications of the judicial review bars under prior amendments
to the INA, such as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), passed just a few months earlier.48 By superseding this earlier
bar, IIRIRA carried forward the rule that aliens subject to removal because
of certain criminal convictions could find no relief in the courts after their
BIA proceedings were complete.49 Further, IIRIRA consolidated exclusion
and deportation proceedings into one “removal” proceeding and
simultaneously implemented a single scheme of judicial review, replacing
the dual system that had existed earlier.50
Interestingly, IIRIRA replaced the prior ban on post-departure judicial
review of BIA rulings.51 As explained later, litigants in challenges of the
post-departure bar have pointed to IIRIRA’s repeal of the bar on postdeparture judicial review as evidence that Congress also intended to abolish
post-departure administrative review, albeit with limited success.52
Further, the statute adopted several new limitations on the filing of
motions to reopen and reconsider, unrelated to the regulatory post-departure
bar. Codifying several of the Attorney General’s regulations related to the
1990 amendments, aliens who are ordered removed are now statutorily
limited to one motion to reopen53 within ninety days of the final order.54
Similarly, they are also limited to one motion to reconsider,55 which must

44. See id. § 204(a)–(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-567.
45. See id. § 105(d), 110 Stat. at 3009-556.
46. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 179 (“In . . . the 1996 Act, Congress
streamlined and accelerated the removal of noncitizens with criminal records.”); see also
infra notes 47–51, 53–59.
47. ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 13, at 179.
48. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 423, 110 Stat. 1214, 1272 (repealed 1996); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and
Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459,
463–64 (2006).
49. Motomura, supra note 48, at 463–64.
50. See id.
51. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-607 (1996); Zhang
v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 657 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Under these revisions to the INA, an alien is
no longer foreclosed from seeking judicial review of a BIA order after he or she departs
from the country.”).
52. See infra notes 214, 219, 270 and accompanying text.
53. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2006).
54. See id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).
55. See id. § 1229a(c)(6)(A).
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be filed within thirty days.56 Additionally, Congress codified several
exceptions to these limitations that were derived from the prior regulations.
These exceptions include motions to reopen that are based on an asylum
request due to changed country conditions57 and, in a later amendment,
motions to reopen filed by battered spouses, children, and parents.58 These
new limitations reflect a further move away from the past, when there were
no such restrictions on an alien’s right to file these motions.59
While Congress adopted these regulations in IIRIRA, it did not adopt all
of the 1990 regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.60 Most
significantly for the purposes of this Note, IIRIRA makes no mention of
either the regulatory post-departure bar or the BIA’s newly promulgated sua
sponte authority.61 In totality, IIRIRA had actually restricted the rights of
aliens in a greater fashion than had existed before, but in levying these
restrictions, had not included a statutory regulatory post-departure bar. In
this void, the Attorney General quickly moved to promulgate new
regulations the following year to reestablish these rules.62
These most recent regulations “reinstated” the post-departure bar and the
BIA’s sua sponte authority.63 Of course, there is the question whether these
regulations were actually “reinstated” at all, or if they had simply always
been present. Thus, IIRIRA’s silence on these matters could be just that:
silence. The Attorney General’s office espoused this belief in promulgating
the new regulations.64 Under this view, the post-departure bar remained
intact after the passage of IIRIRA.
Later in 2000, Congress tried to make it easier for some alien victims of
domestic violence to move to reopen their cases by passing the Violence
Against Women Act of 2000.65 Then, in 2005, Congress added the caveat
that the aliens filing these domestic-violence-based motions to reopen could

56. See id. § 1229a(c)(6)(B).
57. See id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).
58. See id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv); see infra note 65 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 646, 654 (B.I.A. 2008) (“[T]he Board has always had the regulatory power to entertain
motions, but for the first half-century of our existence, there was no statute delineating the
scope or limits of that power.”).
60. Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 657 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Approximately three months
later, Congress codified some—but not all—of the Attorney General’s 1996 regulations
regarding motions to reopen.”).
61. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-587 (1996);
Zhang, 617 F.3d at 657; Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 654.
62. See Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens;
Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312 (Mar. 6, 1997).
63. See id. at 10,330–31.
64. Id. at 10,321 (“No provision of the new section 242 of the Act supports reversing the
long established rule that a motion to reopen or reconsider cannot be made in immigration
proceedings by or on behalf of a person after that person’s departure from the United
States.”).
65. See Pub. L. No. 106-386, div. B, § 1506(c), 114 Stat. 1464, 1528 (2000) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv) (2006)).
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not bring them after departing from the United States.66 This stands as the
most recent congressional word on the post-departure bar.
The circuit courts have differed on the issue of whether the postdeparture bar is still valid following IIRIRA’s omission of a bar and the
subsequent regulations attempting to bring the bar back into existence.67
Some courts have found that the statutory silence clearly indicates
congressional intent to eliminate the bar, while others have found the
statutory silence to be ambiguous, so that the Attorney General’s
regulations must stand, as they have been found to be reasonable.68 Still
other courts have applied the holding of Union Pacific to find that an
agency cannot limit its own jurisdiction, and thus the BIA and IJ must hear
post-departure motions.69
In order to understand this conflict, one must first get a sense for how
removal proceedings work within the larger framework of immigration law.
The following section will discuss the general procedural background for
removal proceedings, and the authorities involved.
C. Removal Proceedings in General
Before delving into the complex details of the conflict over the postdeparture bar, it is important to explain the modern state of the U.S.
immigration enforcement framework and the different types of situations
that could lead to removal. This is important because reviewing courts have
been faced with a variety of different factual scenarios when grappling with
this issue.70
The executive’s removal power is divided among several different
government agencies. After the September 11 attacks, the INS was
abolished, and its functions were mainly moved into the new Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) under the guise of three separate agencies:
(1) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), (2) U.S.
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and (3) U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP).71
The USCIS oversees the issuance of
immigrations benefits, such as work permits and adjustments of status, such

66. See Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 825(a)(2)(F), 119 Stat. 2960, 3063–64 (2006) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV) (2006)).
67. See infra Part II.
68. See infra Part II.B–C, E–F.
69. See infra Part II.B, D.
70. See infra Part II.
71. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205
(codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 291 (2006)); Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 91 n.1 (2d
Cir. 2007); MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 9–10
(3d ed. 2008). Also, the Department of Justice (DOJ) takes some role in handling the INS’
old functions. For example, DOJ supervises the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR). See infra note 75.
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as permanent residence and naturalization.72 ICE handles enforcement of
the laws and performs duties such as executing removal orders,
investigating violations, and detaining violators while their removal
proceedings take place.73 Finally, the CBP handles security both along the
borders and at transportation facilities that serve as points of entry from
overseas.74
When a resident alien or illegal immigrant runs afoul of these agencies,
he or she is referred to the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(EOIR), which runs the U.S. immigration courts, and is under the
supervision of the Department of Justice.75 ICE employs the attorneys who
litigate before the EOIR on behalf of the government.76 Referral is made
by the issuance of a Notice to Appear before a IJ.77 Notices to Appear can
be issued for a violation of immigration law, including being convicted of a
nonimmigration crime while on American soil, or for overstaying a visa.78
Once a Notice to Appear has been served, the alien must report to the one of
fifty-nine immigration courts79 his or her case has been assigned to at the
72. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 10; What We Do, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/ (follow “ABOUT US” hyperlink; then
follow “What We Do” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
73. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 10–11; ICE Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/overview/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2012).
74. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 10–11; CBP Mission Statement and Core Values,
U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/
mission/guardians.xml; See Immigration Inspection Program, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/port_activities/overview.xml (last
visited Oct. 20, 2012).
75. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 12–14; Executive Office for Immigration Review,
U.S. DEP’T JUST., www.justice.gov/eoir (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). “In a removal
proceeding the opposing parties are the noncitizen and ICE. The immigration judges . . . are
today formally independent of the immigration agencies. They are part of the Justice
Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review.” STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY &
CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 504 (5th ed. 2009)
(citations omitted).
76. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 10. “In every case in which removability is
contested, and in certain other situations, ICE must be represented by a lawyer known as a
‘trial attorney.’” LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 75, at 654 (citing 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1240.2(b), 1240.10(d) (2008)). These “trial attorneys” are employed in ICE’s Office of
the Principal Legal Advisor. See id.
77. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 14–15, 51–53; DAVID WEISSBRODT & LAURA
DANIELSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL, 269–71 (5th ed. 2005).
Notices to appear commonly include the allegations against the immigrant, including the
particular statute alleged to be violated, and name an immigration court, date, and time
where the alien can appear to contest the charges. Further, they include a list of rights that
the respondent alien has in relation to the proceeding. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 51–53;
see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 75, at 504 (describing Notices to Appear).
78. See WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 77, at 235–42; RELIEF FROM REMOVAL:
A DEFINITIVE MANUAL FOR WINNING CASES 45–47 (Jill Sheldon ed., 2007–2008).
79. Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last updated Apr. 2011). These courts are commonly located in major
cities such as New York, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver, and Miami. They can also be
found in smaller cities in states that may have significant immigrant populations. For
example, there is a court in the small city of Harlingen, Texas. While there is not an
immigration court in every state, there is a wide geographic distribution, covering each
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date and time provided.80 There, he or she will appear before one of the
over 260 IJs on the bench.81 The government carries the burden of proof in
removal cases before the IJ; therefore, it must show the IJ that there is
“clear and convincing evidence” that the alien is deportable before the IJ
can rule in the government’s favor.82
If the government successfully proves its case, the alien will face
removal.83 The alien can then file a notice of appeal with the BIA within
thirty days of the decision.84 This filing acts as an automatic stay of the
removal order, meaning that the alien cannot be removed before the BIA
takes the case.85 If the alien voluntarily departs the United States while the
appeal is pending, the IJ’s order is then considered final and effective.86
Additionally, a stay is not automatic when the alien files for a review of the
agency’s final decision in the federal circuit court.87
D. The Post-departure Bar in Action
This subsection focuses on four common grounds that a motion to reopen
can be based on, as well as examples of when a motion to reconsider can be
filed. These examples illustrate factual situations that are typical in the case
law. If the BIA upholds the IJ’s decision, the alien now only has a limited
set of options with which to prevent final removal. One option would be to
file a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider and then appeal to a circuit
court if the motion is denied and “constitutional claims or questions of law”
are implicated.88
Before examining the intricacies of the motions to reopen and reconsider,
this Note will briefly discuss the details of the judicial review portion of this
remedy. A petition for judicial review with the circuit court must be filed
within thirty days of the BIA’s final decision.89 Such an appeal does not
carry the automatic stay of removal that an appeal to the BIA from an IJ’s
ruling does.90 Further, these appeals are now limited to “constitutional
region of the United States. See EOIR Immigration Court Listing, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/sibpages/ICadr.htm (last updated Sept. 2012).
80. See supra note 77.
81. See Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last updated Apr. 2011).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8 (2011).
83. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 17.
84. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3; see also WEISSBRODT & DANIELSON, supra note 77, at 309–
11.
85. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(a) (“[T]he decision in any proceeding under this chapter from
which an appeal to the Board may be taken shall not be executed during the time allowed for
the filing of an appeal . . . .”).
86. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(e). Essentially, this means that once the alien departs the United
States prior to filing an appeal, the right to file an appeal is waived.
87. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
88. See infra note 91.
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (2006).
90. See id. § 1252(b)(3)(B) (“Service of the petition on the officer or employee does not
stay the removal of an alien pending the court’s decision on the petition, unless the court
orders otherwise.”); KRAMER, supra note 71, at 21 (“Note that unlike an appeal to the BIA, a
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claims or questions of law”91 and do not review the factual determinations
of the EOIR.92
Before judicial review can be implicated to reopen or reconsider a case,
and potentially lead to a reversed removal order, a motion must be filed.
Motions to reopen are the more common of the two, and usually arise in
four different ways: “changed country conditions with regard to asylum
claims; allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel; new eligibility for
relief from removal; and vacatur of a conviction that formed the basis for
the order of removal.”93
Within asylum claims, “changed country conditions” refers to the
situation that occurs when conditions in the alien’s country of origin have
changed so that the alien now has a well-founded fear of persecution upon
their return, and thus, she now seeks asylum.94 These motions are
sometimes not subject to the same restrictions as other motions to reopen.95
There is a two-step process for the granting of asylum: first, the applicant
must prove he or she is a refugee,96 and second, he or she must prove that
they merit a favorable exercise of discretion by the IJ.97 If the initial
asylum application is denied, but the conditions back home change so that
the alien is now in danger of persecution, a motion to reopen the case can be
granted and asylum ultimately accepted.98

petition for review to the federal court of appeals carries no automatic stay of removal. The
non-American citizen must move for a stay of the removal order.”).
91. The REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302–23,
changed the jurisdictional scheme by limiting jurisdiction to hear these habeas corpus
appeals to the circuit courts. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Further, such review was sharply
limited, including to “constitutional claims or questions of law.” See id.
However,
“questions of law” can be considered somewhat ambiguous. For example, Ramadan v.
Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 650–54 (9th Cir. 2007), held that the merits of a “changed
circumstances” claim could be heard under this standard, even though it was a mixed
question of law and fact, because it involved the review of the application of law to
undisputed facts.
92. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (stating that with limited exception, the findings of fact
from the administrative hearings are conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary”).
93. POST-DEPORTATION HUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS &
INT’L JUSTICE AT BOS. COLL., POST-DEPARTURE MOTIONS TO REOPEN OR RECONSIDER 2
(2012), available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/centers/humanrights/pdf/MTR%20
Advisory%202012%20FINAL.pdf.
94. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006); 8
C.F.R. § 1208.16 (2011); see RELIEF FROM REMOVAL, supra note 78, at 374, 378–80.
95. EOIR IJ Benchbook Motion to Reopen Guide, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, available at
www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/benchbook/tools/Motions to Reopen Guide.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2012).
96. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006) (defining “refugee”); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)
(2011) (explaining that refugee status can be established by showing either past persecution
or a well-founded fear of future persecution).
97. See Ndrecaj v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 667, 674 (6th Cir. 2008) (describing this two-part
test).
98. See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 566 (3d Cir. 2004) (remanding for BIA to reopen
the case after alien made prima facie case for asylum eligibility based on fear of being
persecuted under Chinese family planning laws).
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Second, mistakes made by counsel can be the source of a reopening in
cases where aliens can satisfy the standard for ineffectiveness.99 The
requirements for granting a motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance
of counsel are outlined in In re Lozada.100 Some circuits recognize this as
precedent,101 while others do not recognize this doctrine in relation to
removal proceedings altogether.102 If an alien can successfully meet these
requirements, the motion to reopen will be granted, and the appeal will
again proceed before the BIA.103
Third, claims of new eligibility for relief from removal include situations
where new circumstances make the alien eligible for discretionary relief.
Some examples where this would be possible include when an alien files
for cancellation of removal by meeting certain requirements104 or for
voluntary departure.105 These motions will not be granted if the alien’s
rights to make such an application were explained to them at the initial
proceeding before the IJ, and they were afforded an opportunity to apply for
such relief but failed to do so.106 However, they may be allowed if
subsequent circumstances have arisen.107
99. See Lopez-Vega v. Holder, 336 F. App’x. 622, 623–24 (9th Cir. 2009) (alien’s
counsel missed the deadline to file an appeal to the BIA and incorrectly filled out the
necessary certificate of service); Siong v. INS, 376 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (alien’s
counsel missed the deadline to file an appeal to BIA by several days, causing BIA to dismiss
original appeal as untimely).
100. 19 I. & N. Dec. 637, 639 (B.I.A. 1988).
101. See Zheng v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 409 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2005); Hernandez v.
Reno, 238 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2001).
102. See Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 859–61 (8th Cir. 2008); Magala v. Gonzales,
434 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2005).
103. See Lopez-Vega, 336 F.App’x. at 624.
104. See 5 GORDON, MAILMAN, YALE-LOEHR & WADA, supra note 17, § 64.04[3][a]–[b].
The Attorney General can decide to cancel removal of an alien who has “accrued ten years
of continuous physical presence,” has been a person of “good moral character,” has not been
convicted of certain criminal offenses, and who “establishes that removal would result in
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his or her U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse, parent,
or child.” Id. § 64.04[3][b] (citations omitted); see also EOIR IJ Benchbook Motion to
Reopen Guide, supra note 95.
105. See KRAMER, supra note 71, at 340 (“[A] benefit whereby the individual avoids an
order of removal and is allowed to leave . . . generally of his or her own accord . . . .
Theoretically, an individual who departs . . . pursuant to a grant of voluntary departure
leaves with a ‘clean record,’ and is free to return . . . with proper admission documents.”).
Voluntary departure is available “(1) before the conclusion of removal proceedings; and
(2) at the conclusion of removal proceedings.” 5 GORDON, MAILMAN, YALE-LOEHR &
WADA, supra note 17, § 64.05[1]. There are more requirements for finding voluntary
departure after proceedings have concluded, where the IJ can only allow for voluntary
departure if the alien has been physically present for at least a year preceding service of a
Notice to Appear, the applicant has been a person of “good moral character” for at least five
years prior to the application, the applicant is not deportable for conviction under an
aggravated felony or for participating in terrorist activities, “the alien has established by
clear and convincing evidence that the alien has the means to depart the United States and
intends to do so,” the alien posts bond to ensure departure and the alien was not previously
permitted to voluntarily depart after being found inadmissible. See id. § 64.05[3] (citations
omitted).
106. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (2011).
107. See EOIR IJ Benchbook Motion to Reopen Guide, supra note 95.

2012]

A GATE FOREVER CLOSED?

1065

The fourth common category concerns the vacatur of a criminal
conviction that was the basis for the original removal order. For the first
time in the history of the INA, Congress included a definition of
“conviction” in IIRIRA, as a way to clarify when an alien is eligible for
removal in a variety of situations, including after pleading guilty.108
However, the fact remains that underlying criminal convictions can be
vacated, potentially allowing for reopening.109
For example, it is possible to be “convicted” and removed even if a state
court judge does not formally declare guilt.110 However, if an alien can
successfully vacate his conviction, it still may not be enough to grant a
reopening of the case. While, “[a]s a general rule, [the BIA gives] full faith
and credit to State court actions that purport to vacate an alien’s criminal
conviction[,]”111 if the conviction is based solely on “immigration hardships
or rehabilitation, rather than on the basis of a substantive or procedural
defect in the underlying criminal proceedings,”112 then the conviction is
still valid for the purposes of removal.113 However, if this is not the case,
then the alien may be able to have the case reopened and the removal order
reversed.114
Finally, motions for reconsideration can also be used to try to reverse an
adverse removal order. These motions are wholly separate from motions to
reopen.115 A motion to reconsider should include:
(1) an allegation of material factual or legal errors in the Board’s decision
that is supported by pertinent authority; (2) if the Board summarily
affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision, a showing that the alleged
errors and legal arguments were previously raised on appeal and a
statement explaining how the Board erred in affirming the Immigration
Judge’s decision under the [affirmance without opinion] regulations; and
(3) if there has been a change in law, a reference to the relevant statute,
regulation, or precedent and an explanation of how the outcome of the
Board’s decision is materially affected by the change.116

108. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2006); Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration
Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 328, 331–33 (2d. Cir. 2007) (describing legislative history of this
provision of IIRIRA).
109. See infra notes 211, 229, 265.
110. See Uritsky v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 728, 735 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding “conviction”
where alien had pled guilty to a low-level sexual conduct charge and been sentenced to
probation and fines, with an explicit statement by the court that there was no judgment of
conviction).
111. See In re Chavez-Martinez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 272, 273 (B.I.A. 2007).
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See infra notes 222–40 and accompanying text.
115. See supra Part I.A.1–2.
116. In re O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 60 (B.I.A. 2006); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)
(2011) (regulating motions to reconsider filed with the BIA).
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For example, these motions can be filed in situations where the BIA did not
consider an argument as to why a particular statute was inapplicable to the
alien’s case.117
In these five situations, aliens attempt to reverse an adverse removal
order against them. Unfortunately, if they have already left the country
when the motion is filed, they may come up against the post-departure bar,
which theoretically deprives the BIA or IJ of jurisdiction to hear their
motion. The next section generally discusses the different approaches that
courts have taken in assessing the post-departure bar.
E. Tools for Dismantling or Upholding the Bar:
Chevron and Union Pacific
In recent years, courts approaching the question of whether the postdeparture bar is still valid following IIRIRA have mainly relied on analysis
derived from two cases. The first primary tool to be deployed against the
post-departure bar is the Chevron doctrine. In this case, the Supreme Court
laid out a two-step framework for determining whether an executive agency
interpretation of a possibly ambiguous congressionally enacted statute
should be given judicial deference.118 Chevron concerned the definition of
“stationary source” in the amended Clean Air Act.119 The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) interpreted the statutory language to allow an
entire plant to constitute a single source, making it easier for factory owners
who wanted to build new pollution-emitting devices to gain state approval
as long as the total emissions from the plant did not exceed the statutory
threshold.120 The Court applied a new framework to determine whether an
agency should receive deference for their interpretation of an ambiguous
statute. Ultimately, the Court found that the EPA’s interpretation was
permissible.121
The Chevron analysis proceeds as follows. First, under step one, the
court must determine whether the statute is truly ambiguous, using tools of
statutory interpretation122: “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”123 However, if the statute is
ambiguous, the court must determine whether the agency’s gap-filling was
reasonable, meaning not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the

117.
118.
(1984).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Mu Ju Li v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 575, 576–77 (6th Cir. 2008).
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
Id. at 840.
Id.
Id. at 866.
See id. at 842–43.
Id.
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statute.”124 The Chevron analysis has been performed many times, in many
different areas of law.125
Commentators have different views regarding Chevron’s purpose and
function,126 but it appears that the basic point of the doctrine is to effectuate
congressional intent.127 But in the context of the post-departure bar,
capturing congressional intent is no simple task.128 The answer, under step
one of the Chevron analysis, has led some courts to lift the bar.129
The main alternative ground for attacking the bar is the Court’s decision
in Union Pacific. In this case, the Court was faced with the question of
whether it was appropriate for the National Railroad Adjustment Board
(NRAB) to decline hearing the disciplinary arbitration claims of five
railroad employees for lack of jurisdiction.130 Essentially, the NRAB had
taken a procedural issue and elevated it into a jurisdictional one.131
The Court distinguished a conferencing requirement as a claimprocessing, administrative requirement, instead of a jurisdictional
requirement.132 Therefore, the NRAB could not waive its own subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the cases.133
The decision in Union Pacific has followed a recent trend in which the
Supreme Court has sought to separate jurisdictional rules from
nonjurisdictional rules. Cases in which seemingly minor rules have been
considered jurisdictional are known as “drive-by jurisdictional rulings.”134
124. Id. at 843–44.
125. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 189–90 (2006)
(“Chevron has had a fundamental impact on areas as disparate as taxation, labor law,
environmental protection, immigration, food and drug regulation, and highway safety.”
(citations omitted)).
126. See Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1562 (2007)
(describing the two camps that have emerged, and that some scholars think both motivations
are at work). “The scholarship has settled into two roughly defined camps. One camp
argues that Chevron is a separation of powers decision . . . to abide by and police
congressional intent. The other camp believes that Chevron deference is driven by the
greater competence and experience that agencies have relative to courts in interpreting the
statutes . . . .” Id.; see Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 2071, 2077 (1990) (“[Chevron] embodies, in those applications, a plausible
reconstruction of congressional desires and a sound understanding of the comparative
advantages of agencies in administering complex statutes.”).
127. See Sunstein, supra note 126, at 2109–10.
128. See infra Part II.B, E.
129. See infra notes 222–40, 333–50, and Part II.F.
130. See Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 130 S. Ct. 584, 594 (2009)
(denying jurisdiction because there was not enough proof that mandated conferencing had
taken place at the internal level, even though the objection raised by the industry panel
member was possibly untimely).
131. See id.
132. Id. at 597 (finding that the conferencing requirement was listed as a general duty in
the statute, and not as part of the “‘[e]stablishment[,] . . . powers[,] and duties’ of the
NRAB”).
133. See id. at 596–99.
134. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006) (“We have described such
unrefined dispositions as ‘drive-by jurisdictional rulings’ that should be accorded ‘no
precedential effect’ on the question whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate the
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In these cases, it is common for the issue to be obscured when a case is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because it is unclear whether the
dismissal should really be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for
failure to state a claim.135 In a string of decisions, the Court has struck
down rulings that declined jurisdiction as the result of some failed
precondition.136 This shift in the Court’s thinking was intended to cut back
on overuse of the word “jurisdiction”137 by delineating the line between
rules that are truly “jurisdictional” and those that are not.138 Therefore,
only rules that explicitly grant courts the authority to hear a case will be
found to be truly “jurisdictional.”139 This means that the absence of some
fact alone might not be enough to deprive the court of subject matter
jurisdiction.140
Together, Chevron and Union Pacific have both served as potential
answers to the question of the post-departure bar’s present validity for
different circuits examining the issue.
F. Immigration Law in the Past Decade
In recent years, three norms have emerged that the Supreme Court has
relied on in favor of immigrants: (1) the presumption that administrative
actions should be subject to judicial review, even in the immigration
context; (2) the use of a “clear statement rule” to prevent congressional
silence from being transformed into a nonexistent legislative mandate; and
(3) that immigrants should have every opportunity to fight the harsh
consequences of removal.141
An important case that outlines these three principles is INS v. St. Cyr.142
Enrico St. Cyr was admitted into the United States from Haiti in 1986 and
claim in suit.” (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91(1998)));
Howard M. Wasserman, The Demise of “Drive-By Jurisdictional Rulings,” 105 NW. U. L.
REV. 947, 948 (2011).
135. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511.
136. See Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1200 (2011) (defining
a 120-day time limit for filing an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
from the Board of Veteran Appeals as nonjurisdictional); Union Pacific, 130 S. Ct. at 594;
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1245–47 (2010) (finding a registration
requirement of the Copyright Act nonjurisdictional for the purposes of a district court having
authority to approve a plaintiff class and settlement).
137. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510–11 (2006) (“This Court . . . has sometimes been
profligate in its use of the term.”).
138. See Wasserman, supra note 134, at 955.
139. See id. This does not mean that the plaintiff cannot be defeated on the substantive
claim, but that the claim at least has to be heard if jurisdiction exists. See id. at 949.
“However merits are defined, the question of who should win under substantive law remains
distinct from the court’s adjudicative authority.” Id. at 950.
140. See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (“Judicial opinions, the Second Circuit incisively
observed, ‘often obscure the issue by stating that the court is dismissing for lack of
jurisdiction when some threshold fact has not been established . . . .’” (quoting Da Silva v.
Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
141. See infra notes 142–77 and accompanying text.
142. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
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pled guilty to selling a controlled substance a decade later.143 Before the
passage of AEDPA, St. Cyr would have been eligible for discretionary
relief from removal.144 However, because St. Cyr’s removal proceedings
did not begin until after both AEDPA and IIRIRA were enacted, he was
considered ineligible for that relief.145 St. Cyr subsequently filed a petition
for habeas corpus, claiming that the new restrictions did not apply
retroactively.146 In 2001, the Supreme Court affirmed the ruling that
jurisdiction existed to hear the petition.147
The jurisdictional analysis by the Court included two of the foregoing
principles: the clear statement rule and the judicial review presumption.148
The Court stated that if Congress intended to repeal something as
fundamental as habeas corpus rights, the Court would require proof that
Congress clearly stated that intention.149 Thus, the Court reviewed four
different statutes that were part of AEDPA and IIRIRA and found that none
of those statutes clearly stated that they were stripping habeas corpus
jurisdiction.150 Further, the Court cited the first norm in support of this
ruling.151 Thus, jurisdiction to hear St. Cyr’s petition was proper.152 This
ruling also indirectly serves the third principle, by enabling St. Cyr to have
a further opportunity to attempt to fight his removal.153
143. Id. at 293.
144. See id. (noting that this is the law that would have applied at the time of St. Cyr’s
conviction).
145. Id. (“[R]emoval proceedings against him were not commenced until April 10, 1997,
after both AEDPA and IIRIRA became effective, and, as the Attorney General interprets
those statutes, he no longer has discretion to grant such a waiver.”).
146. Id. The district court exercised jurisdiction over St. Cyr’s petition and agreed, with
the Second Circuit affirming. Id.
147. See id. at 298–314 (finding that the four statutory provisions in question from
AEDPA and IIRIRA could not be found to have repealed habeas corpus jurisdiction for these
cases involving “pure questions of law”). Additionally, the Court went on to find that the
provisions could not apply retroactively. See id. at 314–26.
148. Id. at 298 (“For the INS to prevail it must overcome both the strong presumption in
favor of judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear
statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.”).
149. Before reaching this question, the Court analyzed the pre-1996 statutory scheme
regarding habeas corpus jurisdiction to find that both “pure questions of law” could be raised
before a judge under the Suspension Clause, and that such a practice was common in
immigration law. See id. at 301–08.
150. The four statutes at issue were the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
§ 401(e), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), and three provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), § 1252(a)(2)(c), and
§ 1252(b)(9) (Supp. V 1999). Applying principles of statutory construction, the Court found
a clear statement of repeal lacking. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308–14.
151. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298 n.9 (citing the “strong presumption in favor of judicial
review of administrative action” and supporting precedent).
152. Id. at 314.
153. Following this ruling, a confusing framework for habeas corpus jurisdiction
remained. Interestingly, those who fell under the ruling in St. Cyr (i.e., those who were
ineligible for discretionary relief as the result of being convicted of an aggravated felony)
were left with two judicial layers of review: a habeas petition in the district courts, followed
by an appeal at the circuit level. This is in contrast to those who were still eligible for
discretionary relief, because they could only file a petition for judicial review at the circuit
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These principles have appeared repeatedly in several immigration cases
over the past eleven years. For example, in another case from 2001, these
norms came to the forefront of a decision to place limits on indefinite
detention for aliens facing a removal order. That case, Zadvydas v.
Davis,154 involved a challenge to the potentially indefinite detention of an
alien arrested for intent to distribute cocaine, who was subsequently
punished with a removal order.155 No other country would take him,156 and
he was held for years in American detention under the authority of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6).157
The Supreme Court did not accept the argument that the statute allowed
for indefinite detention, and instead interpreted it so as to avoid a violation
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by reading a
“reasonableness” requirement into the statute.158 The Court’s analysis is
partly based on two of the norms described above: the clear statement rule
and the judicial review presumption.
The Court refused to find grounds for such an extraordinary result as
potentially indefinite detention without a clear statement of congressional
intent.159 Further, while the Court makes note of the strong “plenary
power” of Congress in immigration, that power is not absolute, and the
Court retains a role in striking down laws that violate the Constitution.160
Nine years later, the Court heavily relied on these norms again in a case
involving IIRIRA. In Kucana v. Holder,161 an alien who attempted to file
several motions to reopen a denial of asylum was denied review by the
Seventh Circuit because of a perceived lack of jurisdiction to review
level, and thus receive only one possible level of judicial scrutiny. See id. at 334–35 (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Gerald Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After the REAL ID Act of
2005, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133, 139 (2006) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 174 (2005)
(Conf. Rep.)). This schism was solved by certain provisions of the REAL ID Act, which
eliminated the habeas jurisdiction of the district courts for removal orders. See Neuman,
supra note 153, at 136–42 (describing in detail how the REAL ID Act is structured to
implement this change).
154. 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
155. Id. at 684.
156. Id. at 684–85. Germany refused to take Zadvydas because under German citizenship
guidelines, he was not a German citizen, despite being born in a displaced persons camp in
Germany in 1948. Id. at 684. Further, the Dominican Republic also refused the INS’s
request to admit him even though he had a Dominican-born wife. Id. Finally, Lithuania
refused to take him because he could not prove documentation of Lithuanian citizenship
after he had immigrated to the United States with his Lithuanian-born parents in 1948. Id.
157. Under this statute, the government “may” continue to detain an alien after the ninetyday removal period if they have not yet been deported, or the alien could be granted
supervised release. Further, regulations allow for a panel to decide whether to grant release
within three months following the expiration of the ninety-day period or shortly after, by
weighing factors such as the alien’s criminal history, mental health, and family ties. 8 C.F.R
§ 241.4(f) (2011). If deciding against release, the panel must review their decision again
within a year, or sooner. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(k)(2)(iii), (v) (2011).
158. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–99.
159. Id. at 697–99 (“We have found nothing in the history of these statutes that clearly
demonstrates a congressional intent to authorize indefinite, perhaps permanent, detention.”).
160. See id. at 695.
161. 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010).
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motions to reopen based on discretionary decisions.162 The Seventh Circuit
based this decision on the provision of IIRIRA that purportedly exempts
discretionary decisions of the Attorney General from judicial review.163
Because the Attorney General grants the BIA discretionary authority to hear
a motion to reopen by regulation, the Seventh Circuit interpreted this statute
to apply to regulatory discretion as well as statutory discretion.164
The Supreme Court reversed this interpretation, focusing not only on the
statutory language, which was silent, but also on the statute as a whole.165
Further, the Court relied upon all three of the above-mentioned immigration
law norms to reach its decision.
First, the Court noted the importance of judicial oversight to protect the
right to a motion to reopen, as it is an “‘important [procedural] safeguard’
designed ‘to ensure a proper and lawful disposition’ of immigration
proceedings.”166 This is similar to the third norm, ensuring a fair shake for
immigrants facing removal. Next, the Court referred to the first norm,
stating that statutory ambiguity favors judicial review of administrative
action.167 The Court assumed that Congress would be aware of that
presumption.168 Due to this assumption, the clear statement rule is
implicated because it would then take “‘clear and convincing evidence’ to
dislodge the presumption . . . . There is no such evidence here.”169 Thus,
all three of the above norms are involved in the Court’s decision favoring
Kucana’s less harsh interpretation of the statute.
These norms appear in other recent immigration cases, as well. For
example, in Nken v. Holder,170 the Court resolved a disagreement over
whether the traditional test for granting a stay of a removal order or
IIRIRA’s more stringent test used for injunctions should apply.171 The
162. See id. at 832–33. Kucana filed a motion to reopen in 2006, attempting asylum relief
by claiming changed country conditions in his native Albania, but the BIA denied it because
conditions had improved there since Kucana’s original asylum hearing. He then filed a
petition for review in the Seventh Circuit, claiming an abuse of discretion. Id.
163. See id. at 833; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
164. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 833.
165. Id. at 835–40. The government’s case was predicated on the word “under” in the
statute meaning that because the BIA’s authority was pursuant to the Attorney General, it
fell “under” this exception. Id. at 835–36. However, the Court noted how the provisions
sandwiching this word only referred to statutory discretion. Id. at 836–37. Also, the Court
noted how the exempted decisions were substantive ones made by the Attorney General,
whereas the decision to deny a motion to reopen was related to procedure. Id. at 837–38.
166. Id. at 839 (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2317–19 (2008)).
167. See id. at 839 (“Any lingering doubt about the proper interpretation . . . would be
dispelled by a familiar principle of statutory construction: the presumption favoring judicial
review of administrative action.”).
168. Id.
169. Id. For further analysis on Kucana and the related circuit split regarding judicial
review over the denial of sua sponte motions to reopen by the BIA, see generally Michael A.
Keough, Kucana v. Holder and Judicial Review of the Decision Not to Reopen Sua Sponte in
Immigration Removal Proceedings, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075 (2011).
170. 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009).
171. See id. at 1756. The statute in question is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (2006).
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien
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Court relied upon the clear statement rule in finding that IIRIRA did
nothing to change the traditional test for a stay.172 Also, the Court
disapproved the harsher standard, partly because it made no allowance for
considering the irreparable harm done to the petitioner.173 This may
indirectly serve the third norm, but the Court later seemed to back away
from this principle by refusing to state that removal is so irreparable that it
should lead to an automatic stay.174
Additionally, in Dada v. Mukasey,175 the Court seemed to reference the
clear statement rule in refusing to accept the idea that voluntary departure
removes the right to file a motion to reopen.176 Finally, two recent
decisions do not mention these norms directly, but both were resolved in
favor of the immigrant, suggesting a possible trend in the Court’s rulings to
favor the rights of aliens when removal is at risk.177 This backdrop sets the
stage for the current conflict between circuits regarding the validity of the
post-departure bar.
II. THE QUESTION OF THE POST-DEPARTURE BAR’S CURRENT VALIDITY
It appears that the current state of the post-departure bar’s validity may
be uncertain, as there is a definite trend towards repealing the bar in the
majority of federal circuits. The Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have repealed the postdeparture bar in at least some situations, relying upon a number of different
bases to reach their decisions.178 Additionally, the Supreme Court has
weighed in on the issue in dicta, suggesting that the rule is untenable.179
On the other side, the First Circuit has upheld the bar, and has not reversed
course since.180
pursuant to a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing
evidence that the entry or execution of such order is prohibited as a matter of law.”). 8
U.S.C. § 1252(f)(2) (citation omitted).
172. See Kucana, 129 S. Ct. at 1760 (quoting Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc., v. FCC, 316
U.S. 4, 11 (1942)) (“[W]e are loath to conclude that Congress would, ‘without clearly
expressing such a purpose, deprive the Court of Appeals of its customary power to stay
orders under review.’”).
173. See id.
174. See id. at 1761 (“Although removal is a serious burden for many aliens, it is not
categorically irreparable, as some courts have said.”).
175. 128 S. Ct. 2307 (2008).
176. Id. at 2318 (“We must be reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute was
designed to remove this important safeguard for the distinct class of deportable aliens most
favored by the same law . . . . This is particularly so when the plain text of the statute
reveals no such limitation.”).
177. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485–87 (2010) (finding that an alien’s
attorney’s failure to notify his client of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea was
potentially deficient under the Sixth Amendment); Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159,
1167–68 (2009) (ruling that the BIA’s interpretation of the “persecutor bar” was not entitled
to Chevron deference because it was based on a legal error).
178. See infra Part II.A–B, D–E.
179. See infra notes 241–43.
180. See infra Part II.B–C. The bar’s validity is still an open question in the Eighth and
D.C. Circuits.
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The analysis of this conflict proceeds in several chronological steps.
First, Part II.A–B introduces the question of the bar’s validity with the
Ninth Circuit’s unconventional ruling in Lin v. Gonzales,181 followed by the
subsequent rulings in Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales182 and William v.
Gonzales,183 which were the first to bring Chevron analysis into the picture,
albeit with different results.
Part II.C will discuss the pushback on the initial rulings in Lin and
William, first discussing the BIA’s response to the attack on their lack of
jurisdiction to hear these cases in In re Armendarez-Mendez,184 followed by
the Tenth Circuit in Rosillo-Puga v. Holder.185 This section also details
how the Fifth Circuit indirectly upheld the bar by failing to reach the
question in Ovalles v. Holder.186
Part II.D examines the emergence of Union Pacific in 2009 as a new,
powerful tool in dismantling the bar, which the Seventh Circuit and Sixth
Circuit took advantage of in Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder187 and Pruidze v.
Holder,188 respectively. Additionally, the Second Circuit’s initial reluctant
upholding of the bar in Zhang v. Holder189, and then subsequent repeal of
the bar in some situations in Luna v. Holder190 is noted.
Finally, in Part II.E–F, the most recent rulings on the issue, including
Prestol Espinal v. Attorney General,191 Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder,192
and Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Attorney General193 are discussed. These cases
mark a return back to Chevron analysis as a way to undo the bar, possibly
indicating a future trend in how other circuits may attack the bar. Thus, this
section reveals the chronological history of the post-departure bar, leading
to its current position on its deathbed.
A. Opening Salvos: Lin Opens the Door
The year 2007 marked the beginning of the end194 for the stability of the
post-departure bar, as change began to occur with three circuit court

181. 473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007).
182. 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007).
183. 499 F.3d 329 (4th Cir. 2007).
184. 24 I. & N. Dec. 646 (B.I.A. 2008).
185. 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009).
186. 577 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2009).
187. 612 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2010).
188. 632 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2011).
189. 617 F.3d 650 (2d Cir. 2010).
190. 637 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2011).
191. 653 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2011).
192. 678 F.3d 811 (10th Cir. 2012).
193. 681 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012).
194. There was a somewhat relevant post-departure bar case decided in 2006. In
Contreras-Rodriguez v. U.S. Attorney General, 462 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2006), the Eleventh
Circuit did not directly address the question of the departure bar’s validity; rather the court
stated that if petitioner had not received adequate notice of the proceeding, the BIA and IJ
retain jurisdiction to reopen at any time to consider whether notice was received, even postdeparture. See id. at 1317.
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decisions. In 2007, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the BIA could not decline
jurisdiction to reopen a denial of asylum post-departure because removal
proceedings had concluded.195 Zi-Xing Lin, a Chinese national, attempted
to enter the United States on a flight from Russia with a fraudulent Japanese
passport.196 He was detained and placed in removal proceedings, where he
attempted to secure asylum, which the IJ refused.197 Lin illegally returned
to the United States and filed a new petition for asylum, which was again
denied.198 However, he remained in the United States and filed a motion to
reopen in 2004 based on changed circumstances.199 The IJ rejected the
motion for lack of jurisdiction to reopen the case, and the BIA affirmed this
decision.200
While the decisions of the IJ and BIA were largely based on an
interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), which subjects aliens illegally reentering to their prior removal order, the government’s main argument in
the circuit court was that the post-departure bar applied.201 This argument
was somewhat unusual compared to later cases, because the motion in
question was not filed outside of the United States. Rather, the government
was simply arguing that because Lin had previously departed subject to a
removal order, he could no longer bring a motion to reopen, even after
returning to the United States.202
The Ninth Circuit did not accept this argument, issuing a new reading of
the regulation instead. The court stated, “The regulation is phrased in the
present tense and so by its terms applies only to a person who departs the
United States while he or she ‘is the subject of removal . . . proceedings.”203
Since Lin’s removal proceedings were long over, the ambiguous language,
which the court construed in his favor, suggested that the bar no longer
applied to him.204 This reading has not picked up much support in later
cases,205 but does seem to be one of the first cracks in the wall of the postdeparture bar.
While Lin may have only scratched the armor of the post-departure bar,
two subsequent cases threatened to do far more damage to its continued
existence.
195. Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007).
196. See id. at 980.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 981.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 981–82; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2011).
202. See Lin, 473 F.3d at 982.
203. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)).
204. See id. Additionally, the court found that the motion was improperly denied because
the DHS did not comply with the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. Id. at 982–83.
205. See Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009); Ovalles v. Holder, 577
F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2009); In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646 (B.I.A. 2008).
Also, there is no significant case following Lin that relies on its reasoning as a ground to
dismantle the bar. Interestingly, in a later case, the Ninth Circuit uses a straightforward
Chevron analysis to dismantle an aspect of the BIA post-departure bar. See infra note 304.
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B. Pena-Muriel and William: Chevron Arrives on the Scene
Also in 2007, the First Circuit upheld the post-departure bar through the
use of Chevron analysis.206 Fredy Hugo Pena-Muriel was admitted to the
United States from Bolivia in 1970, when he was less than two years old.207
In 1997, he was convicted of domestic assault under Rhode Island law,
receiving a one-year suspended sentence plus probation.208 Because he
never attained citizenship, he was subsequently placed into removal
proceedings following the conviction.209 The IJ ordered removal, and
Pena-Muriel was removed to Bolivia without attempting to fight the
order.210 In 2002, the conviction was vacated based on a brief affidavit
filed by the victim “stating that Pena-Muriel ‘should not have been
charged.’”211 Pena-Muriel then moved to reopen his case, which the IJ
denied on the basis of the post-departure bar, and the BIA summarily
affirmed.212
Pena-Muriel then filed a writ of habeas corpus in the District of
Massachusetts, which was transferred to the First Circuit under the
provisions of the REAL ID Act.213 Pena-Muriel’s main argument was that
IIRIRA’s removal of the post-departure bar on judicial review of removal
orders214 indicated that the regulatory post-departure bar should also no
longer be enforced by the Attorney General.215
Using a Chevron analysis, the court found that IIRIRA was silent on
whether the administrative post-departure bar was still active.216 Unlike
some later courts,217 the First Circuit interpreted this silence as pure
ambiguity, rather than a reflection of congressional intent.218 Moving to
step two of Chevron, the court rejected Pena-Muriel’s argument that if
Congress was concerned enough with due process to reinstate postdeparture judicial review, it would have similar concerns about
administrative action.219 Finding the Attorney General’s interpretation
206. Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438, 441–42 (1st Cir. 2007).
207. Id. at 440.
208. Id.
209. Id. (on the bases of either committing an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1227
(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006), or a crime of domestic violence, 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(E)(i)).
210. See Pena-Muriel, 489 F.3d at 440.
211. Id.
212. See id. The IJ cited 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), which is the post-departure bar
regulation pertaining specifically to IJs. This situation appears less commonly than when the
BIA must invoke its own regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d).
213. See id. at 440–41.
214. See id. at 441. IIRIRA amended the INA through the deletion of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(c), which banned judicial review of removal orders filed post-departure. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252 (instituting a new judicial review scheme).
215. See Pena-Muriel, 489 F.3d at 441.
216. Id. at 441–42.
217. See infra notes 222–40; Part II.E–F.
218. See Pena-Muriel, 489 F.3d at 441–42.
219. See id. (citing Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 15
(1995) (statement of T. Alexander Aleinikoff, General Counsel, Immigration &
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reasonable, the court upheld the post-departure bar.220 The First Circuit’s
ruling still stands.
While Chevron analysis had been used as a tool to uphold the bar in
Pena-Muriel, it would serve the opposite purpose in a case decided by the
Fourth Circuit, just a few months later. This subsequent decision seems to
have staying power, as the most recent decisions have followed its
approach.221
Tunbosun Olawale William immigrated to the United States in 1996 and
became a permanent legal resident.222 The following year, he was arrested
for receiving a stolen credit card, a violation of Maryland law.223 Soon
after, INS initiated removal proceedings for committing an aggravated
felony224 and for committing a crime of moral turpitude.225 The IJ found
him removable on the moral turpitude charge, and the BIA affirmed.226 In
July 2005, William was removed from the country.227 In October 2005,
William filed a writ of coram nobis228 in state court seeking to vacate his
conviction, which was approved, and in December he filed a motion to
reopen with the BIA.229 The BIA denied this motion, disclaiming
jurisdiction under the post-departure bar.230
A divided Fourth Circuit used Chevron to dismantle the bar, relying on
three significant grounds. First, it is noted that the statutory language of
IIRIRA was silent as to whether departure should bar a motion to reopen.
For the court, this silence was deafening.231 The statute only says that “[a]n
alien may file” the motions in question, without making any distinction
between whether that alien is inside the country or not.232 For the court,
Naturalization Service)). The court found that Pena-Muriel had misunderstood this
testimony, finding that IIRIRA had instead instituted a more restrictive judicial review
scheme than had existed previously, by making it more difficult for an alien to receive a stay
while appealing to the courts. See Pena-Muriel, 489 F.3d at 442. As an offset to the fact that
more aliens would be deported while awaiting judicial review, Congress repealed 8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(c) to allow the removed aliens to continue to pursue their cases. See id. at 442.
220. Id. at 442–44.
221. See infra Part II.E.
222. William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 2007).
223. Id.
224. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(M), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (committing an offense
involving fraud or deceit causing a loss to the victim over $10,000).
225. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i); William, 499 F.3d at 331 .
226. See William, 499 F.3d at 331.
227. Id.
228. “A writ of error coram nobis traditionally has been brought for an alleged error of
fact not appearing on the record and lies to the same court that tried the underlying action in
order that it may correct such error.” Deborah F. Harris, Annotation, Application of Civil or
Criminal Procedural Rules in Federal Court Proceeding on Motion in Nature of Writ of
Error Coram Nobis, 53 A.L.R. FED. 762 § 2 (1981) (citation omitted)). See also Skok v.
State, 760 A.2d 647, 656 (Md. 2000) (citing Bernard v. State, 65 A.2d 297, 298 (Md. 1949))
(describing the Maryland standard for when a writ of coram nobis may be used).
229. See William, 499 F.3d at 331.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 332.
232. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (2006).
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this was an unambiguous announcement that physical location does not
matter.233
The Fourth Circuit bolstered its analysis with two additional
considerations. First, IIRIRA provided for specific restrictions on the right
to file motions to reopen in other ways,234 but was silent as to whether
departure mattered. Thus, the court reasoned that Congress had considered
imposing such restrictions and decided against it.235
Secondly, in the 2005 amendments to the INA protecting alien victims of
domestic violence,236 Congress had added the caveat that for such an alien
to take advantage of the looser filing restrictions, they would have to be
physically present.237 This led the court to draw a “negative inference”:
because the physical presence requirement is present in one part of the
statute and not the other, it must be true that Congress decided not to
Further, if physical presence was required anyway,
include it.238
specifically writing it into the 2005 amendments would render the language
surplusage, a result the court found impermissible.239 For these reasons, the
regulation improperly conflicts with the intent of Congress, and thus, the
BIA cannot rely on it as grounds for their denial to reopen.240
After these initial rulings, the Supreme Court negatively discussed the
bar, albeit in dicta. In Dada, the court was faced with a conflict between
two portions of IIRIRA.241 In resolving the conflict to allow aliens to
withdraw a grant of voluntary departure in order to file a motion to reopen
instead, the court explained that “[a] more expeditious solution to the
untenable conflict between the voluntary departure scheme and the motion
to reopen might be to permit an alien who has departed the United States to
pursue a motion to reopen postdeparture.”242 While the bar was not directly
challenged in Dada, Chief Justice Roberts took notice of the problem

233. See William, 499 F.3d at 332.
234. See supra notes 53–58.
235. See William, 499 F.3d at 333 (citing United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58
(2000)).
236. See supra notes 65–66.
237. See William, 499 F.3d at 333.
238. See id.
239. See id. (citing TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).
240. See id. at 334.
241. See id. at 2313–16 (describing how when an alien is granted voluntary departure
within sixty days following an adverse removal order, they are barred from seeking further
administrative recourse to reverse the order, but they are also barred from withdrawing the
voluntary departure grant in order to file a motion to reopen within ninety days).
242. Id. at 2320.
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during oral argument.243 Perhaps this is an indication that the Court may
find the bar invalid in the future.244
C. The Post-departure Bar Strikes Back
After the decisions in Lin and William, the BIA was faced with the
problem of how to reconcile these decisions with the long history of the
post-departure bar. The BIA expressed strong disagreement with the
holdings of the Ninth and Fourth Circuits in its own subsequent opinion.245
Andres Armendarez-Mendez was removed to Mexico in 2000 following a
1995 cocaine possession and distribution conviction.246 He filed a petition
for review with the Fifth Circuit, which quickly remanded to the BIA in the
wake of the holding in Lin.247 Subsequently, the BIA decided to address
both Lin and William.
In response to Lin, the BIA found that while the ambiguity that the Lin
court found might be present, the context of the rule as a whole forecloses
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of that ambiguity.248 A motion to reopen,
by its very nature, deals with a proceeding that has been closed, and this is
reflected by the short time deadline after a final order to file such a
motion249: “Because the completion of proceedings is a condition
precedent to the filing of a motion to reopen . . . we cannot reasonably
interpret 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) as applying only to motions filed by aliens in
ongoing proceedings.”250 Finally, while the Lin court construed the
ambiguity in favor of the alien,251 the BIA argued that this should only be
used as a principle of “last resort”, and thus, traditional Chevron analysis
would control.252

243. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307 (2008)
(No. 06-1181) (“[I]f I thought it important to reconcile the two [statutes], I would be much
more concerned about that interpretation—that the motion to reopen is automatically
withdrawn [upon departure] than I would suggest we start incorporating equitable tolling
rules . . . .”); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality,
Finality, and the Significance of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 176 n.201 (2010).
244. See Rosenbloom, supra note 243, at 176–77 (noting the parallel between the
successful repeal of the post-departure judicial review bar and a possible repeal of the postdeparture administrative review bar, and the Court’s notice of this parallel in Dada).
245. In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646 (B.I.A. 2008). This means that the
post-departure bar theoretically has been repealed only when IJs sit in circuits that have
lifted the bar at the appellate level. However, in some instances the BIA has continued to
resist lifting of the bar even in circuits where it has been invalidated at the appellate level
through alternative means. This led to the creation of what one writer termed a “phantom
departure bar.” See Rosenbloom, supra note 243, at 159–64.
246. Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 646–47.
247. Id. at 646.
248. Id. at 651.
249. Id.
250. Id. This situation can rarely arise in immigration court, however, where aliens who
have not yet appealed to the BIA file a motion to reopen. See id. at 651–52.
251. Id. at 652; Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 981–82 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001)).
252. See In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 652–53.
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The BIA went on to attempt to undermine William as well. In the BIA’s
view, departure “is a transformative event that fundamentally alters the
alien’s posture under the law.”253 Once this “transformative event” occurs,
the alien has the same legal status as any other alien beyond our borders.254
Thus under immigration law, the duty to protect the borders lies with the
DHS and not the BIA, as the BIA is not responsible for dealing with aliens
beyond our borders.255
Additionally, the BIA rejected the William holding of a negative
inference dismantling the bar. IIRIRA section 304(a) was a limited statute,
only placing restrictions on when such motions can be filed.256 In the
BIA’s view, there was nothing here suggesting that the existing regulatory
scheme was to be overridden.257
While there is some tension between the physical presence requirement
for motions filed by battered aliens258 and IIRIRA’s silence, the BIA rejects
the notion that this tension would be enough to repeal the post-departure
bar.259 Instead, this later requirement is much narrower than the bar as a
whole, and operates only within the specific context of motions filed by
battered aliens.260 However, as noted below, many circuits have declined to
follow the BIA’s reasoning in this case.261
In a subsequent case, the Tenth Circuit landed on the side of the BIA,
albeit for different reasons, by using Chevron analysis to find that the bar
still stood.262 Martin Rosillo-Puga was admitted to the United States from
Mexico in 1995, and was convicted of battery in Indiana in 1997.263 In
2003, he was removed to Mexico upon the ruling of an IJ in Colorado, on
the dual bases of committing an aggravated felony and a crime of domestic
violence.264 Following his removal, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion
that battery under Indiana law was not an aggravated felony or a crime of
domestic violence under immigration law.265 Rosillo-Puga filed a “Motion
to Reconsider and Rescind Removal Order, or in the Alternative to Reopen
Proceedings” three and a half years later, under the IJ’s sua sponte

253. Id. at 656.
254. See id. In fact, a deported alien’s legal status may be even worse, because he or she
is now inadmissible, and if reentering illegally, faces even more onerous criminal sanctions
than a regular illegal immigrant.
255. See id. (“Thus, our inability to entertain motions filed by aliens who have departed
the United States is not just a matter of administrative convenience . . . . Removed aliens
have, by virtue of their departure, literally passed beyond our aid.”).
256. Id. at 657.
257. Id.
258. See supra note 66.
259. See In re Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 658–59.
260. See id. at 659.
261. See infra Part II.D–E.
262. Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009).
263. See id. at 1149.
264. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (aggravated felony); 8 U.S.C. § 1227
(a)(2)(E)(i) (domestic violence).
265. See generally Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003).
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authority.266 The IJ refused, and the BIA affirmed, citing a lack of
jurisdiction under the post-departure bar.267
The court ultimately sided with the vociferous dissent in William.
Performing its own Chevron analysis, the Tenth Circuit found that the
statute was ambiguous for several reasons.268 First, the statute was silent
about the departure bar. The court took this to be just that: silence, and not
proof of congressional intent.269 Accordingly, because the fact that the
judicial post-departure bar was repealed by IIRIRA was not enough to find
that the regulatory post-departure bar was repealed, as the First Circuit had
Additionally, because the physical presence
previously found.270
requirement in domestic violence cases came after the passage of IIRIRA, it
revealed nothing about what Congress was thinking at the time IIRIRA was
enacted.271 Thus, the statute was ambiguous as to congressional intent.
Under the second step of Chevron, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the
William dissent that the agency’s answer was reasonable, meaning it was
not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”272 The
regulations addressed the agency’s power of review, not the judiciary’s.273
Further, it was “inconceivable that Congress would repeal the postdeparture bar, without doing or even saying anything about the forty-year
history of the [bar].”274 This long history is evidence that the agency’s
interpretation was indeed the one favored by Congress at the time of
IIRIRA.275
The Tenth Circuit would not be the only court to go against William, but
it provided the most developed analysis of the bar’s validity at that time.276
However, even the Tenth Circuit would ultimately reverse course a few
years later.277

266. Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1149.
267. See id. at 1150–51.
268. Id. at 1155–58.
269. See id. at 1155 (citing William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 341 (4th Cir. 2007)
(Williams, J., dissenting)) (“Congress often expressly repeals both statutory provisions and
regulations, and it is reasonable to expect that Congress will speak with greater clarity in
overruling long-held agency interpretations like the departure bar . . . .” ).
270. See Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438, 441–43 (1st. Cir. 2007).
271. Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1155.
272. Id. at 1157 (citing William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 335 (4th Cir. 2007)).
273. See id.
274. Id.
275. See id. (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846
(1986)).
276. Compare Rosillo-Puga, 580 F.3d at 1156–57, with Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288,
297–98 (5th Cir. 2009) (agreeing, but deciding the case on procedural grounds), and Zhang
v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 660 (2d Cir. 2010) (agreeing, but expressing reservations). See also
Mendiola v. Holder, 585 F.3d 1303 (10th Cir. 2009). In Mendiola, the 10th Circuit cited
Rosillo-Puga to extend the application of the bar to a factual situation where 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(d) was involved, and where the petitioner’s motion to reopen was based on prior
ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 1309–11.
277. See infra notes 353–58.
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Finally, another possible avenue for the bar’s survival could be a circuit
decision resting entirely on procedural grounds. For example, the Fifth
Circuit indirectly upheld the bar by failing to reach the question at hand.
Ruben Ovalles immigrated to the United States from the Dominican
Republic in 1985 and was convicted of attempted possession of drugs under
Ohio law in 2003.278 The IJ determined that while Ovalles was statutorily
removable279 for a controlled substance conviction, a separate statute did
not provide an additional ground for removal because Ovalles did not serve
jail time.280 Therefore, Ovalles was eligible for cancellation of removal,
which was granted partly as a result of his long work history and family
connections.281 DHS appealed, and the BIA overturned, finding that the
conviction was indeed an aggravated felony, resulting in removal in
2004.282
Shortly after, the Supreme Court held that a “first-time conviction for
simple possession of drugs that is neither an illicit trafficking offense nor a
federal felony does not constitute an aggravated felony for immigration
purposes.”283 Ovalles subsequently filed a motion to reconsider, or
alternatively, a motion to reopen sua sponte in 2007, which the BIA noted
as untimely.284 However, the BIA based its decision on the post-departure
bar itself.285
Upon review, the Fifth Circuit did not explicitly reach the question of the
bar’s validity, finding that Ovalles’ motion had clearly been filed too
late.286 In dicta, the court went on to affirm its support for the bar’s
validity, finding that the BIA had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
applying it.287
Another example of a circuit declining to rule on the validity of the bar
because of procedural issues is the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in OrtegaMarroquin v. Holder.288 In a decision somewhat similar to Ovalles, the
court remanded to the BIA to consider the alien’s claim for equitable
278. Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir. 2009).
279. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (conviction of a controlled substance
violation); Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 291.
280. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). This provision deals with an immigrant’s
conviction for an aggravated felony. Because Ovalles did not actually serve any jail time,
this provision could not apply. See Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 291.
281. See Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 291.
282. Id.
283. Id. (citing Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006)).
284. Id. at 291.
285. Id.
286. See id. at 295 (finding that a motion to reopen had not been filed until more than
three years after the final order of removal had been issued, well outside the thirty-day limit
for motions to reconsider and the ninety-day limit for motions to reopen).
287. See id. at 297–98 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Lin and instead finding
the BIA’s ruling in Armendarez-Mendez as the correct analysis of the question). See
generally Emma Rebhorn, Note, Ovalles v. Holder: Better Late than . . . On Time? The
Fifth Circuit Avoids Ruling on the Validity of the Postdeparture Bar, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1347
(2010) (discussing the details of the case).
288. 640 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2011).
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tolling, as he had missed the ninety-day deadline for filing a motion to
reopen.289
The Fifth Circuit ultimately confirmed Ovalles’s foreshadowing dicta
with its ruling in Toora v. Holder.290 However, the bar did not survive for
very long in the Fifth Circuit; it was ultimately struck down in 2012 using
Chevron analysis.291
Following the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Rosillo-Puga,292 another new
base of attack against the post-departure bar emerged, setting the stage for
further invalidations of the post-departure bar, in contrast with some of the
previous decisions.
D. Union Pacific: A New Weapon Against the Bar
The Seventh Circuit took the post-departure bar analysis in a new
direction with its ruling in Marin-Rodriguez. While ultimately agreeing
with the Fourth Circuit against the bar, the court reached that result by a
very different path.293
Jose Concepcion Marin-Rodriguez entered the United States illegally in
1988 and stayed out of trouble until being convicted for using fake
documents to obtain employment under a pretense of citizenship in 2005.294
He moved for cancellation of removal before the IJ, who demanded that he
submit his fingerprints to be eligible for that relief in accordance with
federal regulations.295 Marin-Rodriguez failed to comply, and the IJ
ordered his removal.296 While his appeal to the BIA was pending, MarinRodriguez finally submitted his fingerprints and asked for a remand to the
IJ for reconsideration, which was denied.297 He then filed a motion for
reconsideration, stating that a motion for remand filed during a pending
appeal cannot be untimely.298 The BIA agreed and remanded, but the DHS
asked the BIA to reconsider because Marin-Rodriguez had already been
removed.299 The BIA granted the DHS’s motion and cancelled the
remand.300
The Seventh Circuit overturned this decision, but not because of
Chevron. Instead, the court found that the BIA based its decision on a lack

289. See id. at 819–21.
290. 603 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2010). In Toora, the Fifth Circuit upheld the post-departure
bar in a case where the alien had departed the United States after the initiation of removal
proceedings, but before a deportation order was issued. See id. at 283, 286–87.
291. Garcia Carias v. Holder, No. 11-60550, 2012 WL 4458228, at *6 (5th Cir. Sept. 27,
2012).
292. Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2009).
293. Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 591–92 (7th Cir. 2010).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 592 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(d) (2011)).
296. Id.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See id.
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of jurisdiction, and “[a]s a rule about subject-matter jurisdiction,
§ 1003.2(d) is untenable.”301
The court found that nothing passed since 1996 allows the BIA to say
that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on cases that can affect the legal rights of
those who have been removed.302 First, under the new ruling in Union
Pacific, the court noted that an agency is unable to contract its own
jurisdiction.303 Second, the court agreed with the holdings in Coyt v.
Holder304 and Madrigal v. Holder305 that the post-departure bar should not
apply when the alien is removed involuntarily.306 Under Union Pacific, if
the BIA believes that the regulation limits its jurisdiction it would be
inconsistent to allow the BIA to limit its own jurisdiction by taking an
action to involuntarily remove an alien.307
The logic in Marin-Rodriguez has proven powerful, as it was soon
accepted by the Sixth Circuit in Pruidze and later the Second Circuit in
Luna. The Sixth Circuit held that Pruidze’s post-departure motion to
reopen could not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the BIA following
the redocketing of his criminal conviction.308 The court relied upon MarinRodriguez in finding that Union Pacific barred a waiving of an agency’s
own jurisdiction.309
Further, in dicta, the Sixth Circuit seemed to move away from using
Chevron to solve this problem. While first noting the historic debate
between Justices Brennan and Scalia about whether Chevron deference
applies to an agency’s self-determination of its jurisdiction,310 the court

301. Id. at 593.
302. See id. at 594.
303. See Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 594; supra notes 130–40 and accompanying text.
304. 593 F.3d 902, 905–07 (9th Cir. 2010). Another point to note about Coyt is that the
Ninth Circuit used a different analysis from Lin, instead relying on Chevron. See id. at 905–
07. The court held that it would be counter to the statutory scheme of IIRIRA to allow the
government to cut off a pending motion to reopen by forcibly removing the immigrant. See
id. at 907. The court reasoned that allowing the government to do this would undo the idea
of granting a statutory right to file these motions in the first place. See id.
305. 572 F.3d 239, 243–45 (6th Cir. 2009).
306. See Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 594.
307. See id.
308. Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 239, 245 (6th Cir. 2009).
309. See id. at 239 (“On this statutory slate, the agency may not disclaim jurisdiction to
handle a motion to reopen that Congress empowered it to resolve.”).
310. See id. at 237 (noting that the question first arose in Miss. Power & Light Co. v.
Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988), and has yet to be resolved). Justice Scalia,
in his concurrence, took the view that an agency should receive Chevron deference when
interpreting its own jurisdiction for three reasons: they have general expertise; Congress
would expect agencies to exercise their expertise to answer these questions; and courts find
difficulty in separating jurisdictional issues from nonjurisdictional ones. See Nathan
Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency
Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1507–08 (2009) (citing Miss.
Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 381–82 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)). Meanwhile, in dissent in the same case, Justice Brennan argued for a more
moderate approach, only allowing for deference when an agency’s interpretation confines
the scope of authority “to the areas Congress intended it to occupy.” Id. at 1509–10 (quoting
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declined to answer this question, as it was unnecessary following Union
Pacific.311 The court went on to say that even under Chevron, the BIA
would not be able to do this.312 Essentially, Chevron is used to defer to an
agency when it fills statutory gaps, not when it creates new ones, “and in
this instance Congress left no gap to fill when it empowered the agency to
consider all motions to reopen filed by an alien.”313
An example of a circuit holding differently after Union Pacific is the
Second Circuit in Zhang, where the court upheld the BIA’s position
supporting the post-departure bar.314 The IJ found the asylum claim of an
immigrant frivolous, with the BIA summarily affirming.315 Zhang was
ultimately removed following denial of a stay of removal, but the BIA—
seemingly unaware of this—granted his motion to reopen shortly after.316
After this fact came to light, the IJ terminated the case, with the BIA
affirming and vacating its earlier order.317
The court did not apply Chevron to this question, and instead rested on
the framework that legal questions decided by the BIA are reviewed de
novo, and its regulatory interpretations are owed deference unless plainly
erroneous.318 Because the framework is different in this example, the
jurisdictional problems raised in the cases following Union Pacific were not
in play for the court.319 Essentially, the court found that the interpretation
was not erroneous but not without expressing some serious misgivings.320
Some of these misgivings include the Seventh Circuit’s concern with how
forcible removal can constitute a withdrawal of any pending motions made
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 386 (1988) (Brennan,
J., dissenting)).
311. See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 237–41.
312. Id. at 240 (“Whatever powers of interpretation Chevron gives agencies, it does not
allow them to alchemize the authority to pass a mandatory rule into the authority to pass a
jurisdictional one.”).
313. Id.
314. Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 655 (2d Cir. 2010).
315. See id. at 653.
316. See id. at 654 (noting how the BIA exercised its sua sponte authority to reopen the
case just two days after Zhang had been removed to China).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 660. The court cited Second Circuit cases that are derivative of Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997), for this framework. Zhang, 617 F.3d at 660. While the
court noted later that they were not using a Chevron analysis “[a]nd petitioner has not argued
that the manner in which the Attorney General has chosen to define the BIA’s jurisdiction
conflicts with the INA or leads to some sort of interpretive problem under [Chevron],” this
analysis bears some clear similarities to a Chevron analysis, mainly in applying the
erroneous standard to the agency’s interpretation. See id. at 665. This difference arose
because, in other cases, petitioners are challenging the denial of jurisdiction over a motion
explicitly granted by the INA (for example, in Marin-Rodriguez, a motion for
reconsideration), while here, Zhang’s challenge came under the regulation promulgated by
the Attorney General that granted the BIA sua sponte authority to reopen. See id. at 663–64.
319. Id. at 664 (explaining how these facts do not deal with the jurisdiction granted by the
IIRIRA, but rather by regulations promulgated by the Attorney General).
320. See id. at 660 (“To be sure, the BIA’s construction is anything but airtight . . . .
Were we writing on a blank slate, we might reach a different conclusion . . . .”). However,
the court found that the slate was not blank, and instead relied on Armendarez-Mendez. Id.
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by an alien321 and questions about whether such a withdrawal is truly
“jurisdictional.”322 The court’s clear discomfort with the BIA’s stance
possibly set the stage for the Second Circuit’s later decision in Luna. In
Luna, the Second Circuit somewhat changed course by applying the
reasoning of Union Pacific to strike down the post-departure bar.323
The court found that the BIA could not “contract” its given jurisdiction to
hear a motion to reopen, because “‘the power to establish jurisdictional bars
resides with Congress.’”324 Further, “every indication points to the fact that
Congress did not intend to create a jurisdictional bar for motions to reopen
filed by an alien in the United States who is later removed from the United
States.”325 Thus, “[t]he BIA must exercise its full jurisdiction to adjudicate
a statutory motion to reopen by an alien who is removed or otherwise
departs the United States before or after filing the motion.”326 While
declining to repeal the bar in every possible factual context,327 the Luna
decision represents another strong attack on the bar’s national acceptance,
as the Second Circuit now seems to have made a strong statement for
abandoning it.
Even the BIA has backed off their stance in Armendarez-Mendez, albeit
only in very limited circumstances. In In re Bulnes-Nolasco,328 the BIA
found that the application of the IJ post-departure bar would be unfair in
cases of in absentia deportations.329 Essentially, this would give the bar
“greater force than it is entitled to by law”330 because the alien would be
unfairly denied notice.331 Therefore, it appears that even the BIA may be
backing off, at least in rare circumstances.
Following these holdings, it is unclear which tool is more powerful in
dismantling the bar: Chevron or Union Pacific. Recent rulings by the
Third, Tenth, Eleventh and Fifth Circuits may provide an answer.

321. Id.
322. See id.
323. See Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 100 (2d Cir. 2011).
324. Id. (quoting Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2000)).
325. Id. The court draws this conclusion from several sources. First, it points to
Congress’s failure to codify a physical presence requirement in IIRIRA, especially in light of
the fact that IIRIRA repealed the post-departure bar for judicial review of BIA decisions. See
id. at 101. Further, an apparent intent of IIRIRA is “prompt removal and speedy government
action. See id. This intent is served by removal of the post-departure bar, along with
requiring removal within ninety days of a removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (2006)
(ninety day deadline); Luna, 637 F.3d at 101. Finally, the court pointed to the subsequent
REAL ID Act to show “no indication that an alien’s departure after filing a motion to reopen
is a jurisdictional bar. See id.
326. Luna, 637 F.3d at 102.
327. See id.
328. 25 I. & N. Dec. 57 (B.I.A. 2009).
329. See id. at 59–60.
330. Id. at 60.
331. See id. at 59.
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E. Prestol Espinal: A Return to Chevron?
When the Third Circuit finally heard a post-departure bar challenge in
2011, it decided to break course from the more recent decisions in MarinRodriguez and Pruidze by centering its analysis on Chevron as opposed to
Union Pacific. Prestol Espinal was the first case since Union Pacific to
choose the Chevron route as its primary line of attack.332 Ramon Prestol
Espinal, after being born in the Dominican Republic, lived in the United
States from 1982–2009.333 In 2009, he was entered into removal
proceedings following convictions in 2004 for controlled substance
possession and violation of a protective order.334 Prestol Espinal admitted
the charges, but he filed for asylum and withholding of removal.335 The IJ
denied these applications for relief, and the BIA affirmed, with Prestol
Espinal being removed shortly after.336 Once he was removed, Prestol
Espinal filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied based on lack of
jurisdiction under the post-departure bar.337
The Third Circuit expressly adopted the Chevron-based conclusions of
William338 and gave support to similar findings by the Sixth339 and Ninth
Circuits.340 Essentially, the Third Circuit found that Congress spoke clearly
in IIRIRA, by failing to distinguish between the rights of aliens who were
inside the country and those that were outside.341 Additionally, the court
noted the holdings in Pruidze and Marin-Rodriguez based on Union Pacific,
but because the court used Chevron, they were not dispositive in this
case.342 Finally, the Third Circuit referred back to the Supreme Court’s
seeming disapproval of the bar in dicta.343 The court went further, using
language that could have implications for future Chevron analysis. It
asserted that the government “manufactures” an ambiguity from
congressional failure to specifically enumerate each possible exception344:
“That approach would create an ‘ambiguity’ in almost all statutes,
332. Prestol Espinal v. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2011). Zhang used
Chevron as well, but as a way to uphold the bar, rather than to dismantle it.
333. Id. at 214–15.
334. Id. at 215.
335. See id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See id. at 217 (agreeing that IIRIRA says “an alien may file,” without a distinction
between aliens inside and outside of the country).
339. See id. (finding that IIRIRA does not lend support to an interpretation that aliens lose
the right to file once outside of the country).
340. See id.
341. See id. at 220–24 (explaining the multiple reasons why the Third Circuit determined
Congress spoke clearly on the issue).
342. See id. at 218 n.4 (“Because we decide the case based on Chevron, we need not
definitively resolve whether Union Pacific presents a distinct question.”).
343. Id. at 219 (“Significantly, the Court noted that ‘[a] more expeditious solution to the
untenable conflict . . . might be to permit an alien who has departed the United States to
pursue a motion to reopen postdeparture.’” (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2320
(2008))).
344. See id. at 220.
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necessitating deference to nearly all agency determinations.”345 Ultimately,
the Third Circuit came down on the side of the dicta analysis in Pruidze,
ruling that there was no statutory gap that needed to be filled by the
Attorney General.346
Finally, the court examined the statutory scheme of IIRIRA as a whole to
find no basis for the post-departure bar. Citing the same principle as
William, the Third Circuit found that the presence of other provisions in the
statute, such as the new procedural requirements, indicated that Congress
considered the idea of a post-departure bar and decided not to include it.347
This was bolstered by the fact that Congress had been aware of the postdeparture limitations and decided not to include them in IIRIRA.348 Next,
the court pointed to the repeal of judicial review in IIRIRA and the
codification of the right to reopen as evidence that Congress intended
IIRIRA to possibly allow aliens who deserved to stay under the law more
opportunities for review.349 Finally, as other courts have mentioned, the
existence of a physical presence requirement in extended-time motions filed
by victims of domestic violence, indicates that the post-departure bar was
not a background rule under IIRIRA.350 For these reasons, the court found
that the post-departure bar was invalid in this situation for conflicting with
IIRIRA.351
Prestol Espinal thus illustrates a return to a Chevron-based analysis for
evaluating the post-departure bar. The Tenth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits
would soon follow suit.

345. Id.
346. See id. at 221.
347. See id. at 222; William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing United
States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000)).
348. See Prestol Espinal, 653 F.3d at 222.
349. Id. at 222–23. The court wrote:
By repealing the post-departure bar to petitions for review before courts of
appeals, IIRIRA gave aliens greater opportunity for review of deportation orders
than they had previously. This is consistent with IIRIRA’s dual objectives ‘to
expedite the physical removal of those aliens not entitled to admission to the
United States, while at the same time increasing the accuracy of such
determinations.’
Id. (quoting Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 906 (9th Cir. 2010)).
350. Id. at 223–24.
351. Id. at 224. In a subsequent case, the Third Circuit upheld the validity of the postdeparture bar when the BIA refused to hear a motion to reopen under its sua sponte
authority. See Desai v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., No. 11-3229, 2012 WL 3570718 (3d Cir. Aug.
21, 2012). The Third Circuit distinguished this case from Prestol Espinal because Prestol
Espinal involved the nullification of a statutory right to reopen, while the BIA’s right to
reopen sua sponte is derived only from a regulation. See id. at *2–3 (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(a) (2011)). Thus, in the Third Circuit, the BIA can still deny sua sponte
jurisdiction to hear post-departure motions. See id. at *3.

1088

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

F. 2012: A Year of Further Steps for Chevron
In 2012, the Tenth Circuit reversed and repealed its previously strong
stance that the post-departure bar was valid.352 Jesus Contreras-Bocanegra,
a lawful permanent resident originally from Mexico, was convicted of
attempted possession of a controlled substance in 1991, receiving a
suspended jail sentence.353 In 2004, he was detained by DHS after
reentering the United States following a visit to his native Mexico and
placed in removal proceedings.354 The IJ directed that he be removed, with
the BIA affirming.355 After being removed to Mexico, ContrerasBocanegra promptly filed a motion to reopen grounded in ineffective
assistance of counsel.356 This motion was denied by the BIA because of the
post-departure bar, and Contreras-Bocanegra’s subsequent petition for
review to the Tenth Circuit was also denied by relying on the circuit’s
strong precedent in favor of the bar.357
Upon rehearing the case en banc, the Tenth Circuit drastically reversed
course from its prior decisions. Employing the Chevron analysis, the court
found that Congress spoke clearly in the plain language of the statute, the
structure of the statute, and the overall structure and purpose of IIRIRA, so
that the post-departure bar could not stand.358
This decision may well have been the biggest blow yet to the postdeparture bar, as the Tenth Circuit previously had a strong stance in favor of
keeping it.359 Further, this represented another “victory” for Chevron
analysis over Union Pacific. A few months later, the Eleventh Circuit
would join the fray, also using Chevron to disable the bar.360

352. See supra notes 262–76.
353. Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F. 3d 811, 813 (10th Cir. 2012).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See id. at 814 (citing Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir.
2010)). The earlier Contreras-Bocanegra decision relied on Rosillo-Puga v. Holder, 580
F.3d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir. 2009).
358. The court reached this ruling by looking to the plain language of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(a) (2006), the structure of the statute, and the overall structure of IIRIRA. See
Contreras-Bocanegra, 678 F.3d at 816–18. Finding that the language of the statute refers
only to an “alien,” without regard to that alien’s physical location, the court ruled that
“[d]eparted noncitizens are accordingly ‘a subset of the group.” Id. at 817 (citing William v.
Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 2007)). Further, the structure of the statute itself does
not include a geographic limitation, even while Congress was codifying other limitations,
such as numeric limitations in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A). See id. Thus, the court concluded
that Congress “deliberately omitt[ed]” the bar. Id. Finally, the court found that IIRIRA was
designed to simultaneously accomplish prompt removal while keeping legal options open, as
shown by IIRIRA’s repeal of the departure bar for judicial review. See id. Therefore, the
only way to reconcile a removal deadline with a deadline for filing motions to reopen was to
allow the filing of post-departure motions. See id. (citing Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 907
(9th Cir. 2010)).
359. See supra notes 262–76 and accompanying text.
360. Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 681 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2012).
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Jian Le Lin illegally immigrated to the United States from China in 1992
and was placed into removal proceedings for that illegal entry in 1998.361
His asylum request was denied, and he was ordered removed by an IJ, with
the BIA affirming in 2002.362 In 2010, he was still in the United States
when he filed a motion to reopen based on a new request for asylum,
involving changed country conditions.363 He also requested that the BIA
reopen proceedings via its sua sponte authority.364 Lin’s requests were
denied, and he was removed in April 2011, with the BIA deciding that his
motion to reopen was withdrawn because of the post-departure bar.365 Lin
then filed a petition for review with the Eleventh Circuit.366
The Eleventh Circuit relied on Chevron analysis to find that Congress
spoke clearly in IIRIRA, so that the post-departure bar was invalid.367
Similar to the analysis in Contreras-Bocanegra, the court reasoned that “the
plain language of the statute, the statutory structure, and the amendment
scheme . . . point to one conclusion: IIRIRA guarantees an alien the right to
file one motion to reopen, and the departure bar impermissibly undercuts
that right.”368
Finally, in the most recent word on the bar, the Fifth Circuit held the bar
invalid under Chevron, albeit with a slightly different analysis than that
used by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.369 This represents another
361. Id. at 1238.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 1241.
368. Id. Like the Tenth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plain language of the
statute makes no mention of a geographic restriction. See id. at 1239; Contreras-Bocanegra
v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811, 817 (10th Cir. 2012). Secondly, the court pointed to the fact that
domestic violence victims do not have a ninety-day deadline to file a motion to reopen as
long as they were physically present in the United States at filing. See Lin, 681 F.3d at 1240
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(IV) (2006)). Therefore, Congress intentionally did not
require physical presence, except in those circumstances relating to domestic violence
victims. See id. Finally, the court pointed to IIRIRA’s overall scheme to conclude that
because IIRIRA removed the judicial departure bar, it also made the same choice to remove
the administrative departure bar. See id. at 1240–41. See also supra note 358 for a similar
analysis by the Tenth Circuit.
369. Garcia Carias v. Holder, No. 11-60550, 2012 WL 4458228, at *4–6 (5th Cir. Sept.
27, 2012). Here, the Fifth Circuit found that the bar was invalid under the first step of
Chevron analysis, because Congress spoke unambiguously. See id. at *5 (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7) (2006)). The court cited three reasons for this decision. First, the statute does
not mention a geographic restriction on an alien’s statutory right to file a motion to reopen in
the governing statute. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A)). Next, the court noted that
while omitting a geographic restriction, Congress placed other restrictions on this statutory
right, such as limitations on time. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B)–(C)). Finally,
the court pointed to the geographic restriction on untimely motions filed by domestic
violence victims as evidence that Congress did not intend for such a restriction to be placed
on an alien’s regular statutory motion to reopen. See id. at *6. This analysis is very similar
to that of the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits. See supra notes 358, 368 and accompanying text.
However, it differs slightly in that it does not specifically mention the previous repeal of the
post-departure judicial review bar in IIRIRA as evidence that the administrative post-

1090

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

important change in the status of the bar, as the Fifth Circuit had previously
upheld its validity in certain factual circumstances.370 Yet again, in 2012,
Chevron prevailed over both the post-departure bar, and Union Pacific.
In summary, the number of circuits that have repealed the bar, at least in
the factual circumstances that have been presented to them, is nine. Of
these nine, those primarily relying on the Chevron analysis are the Third,371
Fourth,372 Fifth,373 Tenth,374 Ninth375 and Eleventh Circuits.376 Those
circuits relying primarily on the Union Pacific reasoning are the Second,377
Sixth,378 and Seventh.379 Additionally, the Supreme Court wrote in favor
of repeal in dicta.380 Meanwhile, the First Circuit continues to uphold the
bar,381 while this issue remains open in the Eighth382 and D.C. Circuits.383
As time marches on, it seems likely that the post-departure bar will
continue to come closer to its death, as the recent trend has been for circuits
to invalidate the bar. This has been the case even when one circuit, the
Tenth, had previously issued two strong rulings in favor of the bar’s
validity.384
III. WHERE TWO FORKS OF THE ROAD MEET AGAIN
The issue of how exactly the bar may ultimately be struck down is
beyond the scope of this Note. How the bar will meet its end—whether the
circuits ultimately reach agreement, the Supreme Court finally decides the
issue, or Congress amends the statutory language to either codify the
regulatory post-departure bar or eliminate it once and for all—is unclear.385
departure bar should be struck down. See Garcia Carias, 2012 WL 4458228, at *5–6; supra
notes 358, 368 and accompanying text. Additionally, in a companion case, the Fifth Circuit
considered whether this reasoning applies in cases involving an alien’s statutory right to file
a motion to reconsider. See Lari v. Holder, Nos. 11-60549, 11-60706, 2012 WL 4458213
(5th Cir. Sept. 27, 2012). Again, the court applied Chevron to strike down the bar. See id. at
*4–5.
370. See supra notes 278–87, 290 and accompanying text.
371. See supra Part II–E.
372. See supra notes 222–40 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 352–58 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 361–68 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 323–27 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 308–13 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 293–307 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 206–20 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 288–89 and accompanying text.
383. It appears that the D.C. Circuit has yet to broach the validity of the post-departure
bar.
384. See supra notes 262–76 and accompanying text.
385. For a thorough discussion on specific resolutions for the conflict surrounding the
post-departure bar, see Daniel E. Bonilla, Comment, Dearly Departed: An Analysis of the
Departure Bar under Mendiola v. Holder and William v. Gonzales, 42 SETON HALL L. REV.
275, 306–15 (2012). First, Bonilla argues that the Supreme Court should take the case to
resolve concerns such as potential forum-shopping, lack of predictability and uniformity, and
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However, Part III frames a resolution in terms of a possible Supreme Court
ruling or agreement among all the circuits. This Part will argue that it
ultimately does not matter whether the circuits or the Supreme Court use
Chevron or Union Pacific to overturn the post-departure bar, because using
either base of reasoning to strike the bar is in line with three recent and
prevalent norms in immigration law.
Parts III.A and III.B of this Note examine the two primary bases for
overturning the post-departure bar that have been applied by the circuits:
Chevron and Union Pacific, respectively. Next, Part III.C explains why it
does not matter which base emerges as the dominant reasoning for
eliminating the bar, as either base would help satisfy three prevalent norms
in immigration cases decided by the Supreme Court.
A. Anti-Chevron: An Agency Denied
Currently, it seems evident that the overwhelming trend among circuit
courts is to lift the bar. As detailed in Parts I and II, this is indicated by the
number of courts that have chosen to remove the bar, either through the use
of Chevron analysis or an application of Union Pacific.
A more open question than whether or not the bar will be lifted is what
basis the courts will use to ground their reasoning. Two main bases have
emerged for the invalidation of the bar.386 The first is Chevron analysis,
where the silence of IIRIRA clearly indicates congressional intent for the
bar to be repealed. One might call this an “anti-Chevron” analysis because
the doctrine is invoked as a reason not to defer to the agency. The other
basis is the application of Union Pacific, which is part of a line of cases
where the Supreme Court has attempted to clearly delineate between
“jurisdictional” and “claim-processing” rules, as a way to avoid “drive-by
jurisdictional rulings.”387
These two bases, while producing the same result of repealing the bar,388
could arguably be seen as being in some tension. While both bases
technically deal with the idea that an agency should take jurisdiction over
some matter,389 Chevron is actually applied in this case to take a decision
away from an agency by approximating congressional intent, whereas
Union Pacific is being used to protect a quasi-judicial function that the BIA
is trying to relinquish.390 While application of Chevron forces the BIA and
IJ to at least consider motions filed post-departure, it does so by going
against regulations promulgated by the technical supervisor of the EOIR,
judicial inefficiency over this circuit conflict. See id. at 307–08. Second, Bonilla argues that
if the Supreme Court does not issue a ruling, Congress can amend IIRIRA to either banish
the bar or preserve it, and provides specific examples of amending language that could
possibly accomplish either of those ends. See id. at 309–14.
386. See supra Part I.E.
387. Wasserman, supra note 134, at 948–50.
388. See supra Part II.
389. See supra Part I.E.
390. See supra Part II.
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the Attorney General.391 In this way, Chevron functions opposite to how it
was intended, by overriding an agency’s own regulations. Thus, perhaps it
could be described as an anti-Chevron application.
The application of Chevron to undermine an administrative regulation
that explicitly declines jurisdiction seems to fly in the face of what Chevron
was intended to do. There are two views as to Chevron’s motivating
purpose. First, that Chevron is designed to enforce the intent of Congress
by preventing judicial interference with statutes that delegate power to the
agencies.392 Second, Chevron is a way to funnel complicated matters to the
agencies who have the best expertise in interpreting complex statutes.393
Chevron appears to work differently in this context. The agency has
already decided to interpret the statute to decline jurisdiction over these
motions,394 but courts are using Chevron to dismantle these statutory
interpretations, rather than giving deference to the agency.395 In this way,
the normal presumption of Chevron is flipped on its head within the context
of the post-departure bar.
B. Union Pacific: Another Means to the Same End
The ruling of Union Pacific is not in tension with the anti-Chevron
analysis in the post-departure bar context. Union Pacific fits into a line of
cases where the Supreme Court is attempting to eliminate the problem of
“drive-by jurisdictional rulings.”396 It may be arguable that Union Pacific
and traditional Chevron analysis are in some tension, because the Union
Pacific line of cases deals with reversing an agency’s attempt to decline its
own jurisdiction,397 while Chevron is seemingly intended to give rise to an
agency’s interpretation, as opposed to that of the courts.398
However, when Chevron analysis in this context is viewed as a kind of
anti-Chevron, the use of the two bases seems more logical. Both are
applied in order to undo an agency’s decision not to take jurisdiction over
the case.399 Both are also applied to better effectuate the perceived intent of
Congress in passing IIRIRA.400 Most importantly, these two bases fit
within the overarching norms that are at the forefront of several recent
Supreme Court immigration cases.401

391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

See supra Part II.A–B.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 134–40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134–40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118–26 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 240, 302, 348 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.F.
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C. Why Either Answer is Correct
Ultimately, it does not matter whether Chevron or Union Pacific emerges
as the primary reason for invalidation of the post-departure bar. Both bases
provide the same favorable outcome to immigrants seeking to file postdeparture motions.402 More importantly, either basis satisfies a number of
norms that have emerged in recent cases, suggesting that invalidation of the
post-departure bar is the correct result, when compared to the rest of
immigration law. These three principles are: (1) the strong presumption in
favor of judicial review of administrative action; (2) the “clear statement
rule”; and (3) that immigrants should have a robust opportunity to fight the
harsh consequences of deportation.403
Together, these three principles are served by both the anti-Chevron
application and the precedential power of Union Pacific. The Chevron
application here serves the principle in favor of judicial review by reversing
the Attorney General, and using the power of judicial review to force at
least some consideration of the proffered motions.404 While the review here
is administrative instead of judicial, it does constitute one further bite at the
apple for immigrants, even if they have already departed the American
borders. In this way, the third principle is also served, as immigrants
receive that extra bite at the apple.
Additionally, the clear statement rule is served by this anti-Chevron
application. The circuits reach this outcome by determining at the first step
of Chevron that IIRIRA’s silence on the post-departure bar indicates that
Congress did not intend for it to exist anymore.405 This seems to be a
derivation of the clear statement rule as described in St. Cyr.406 Essentially,
if Congress did not clearly state that such a restrictive provision were to
exist, the administrative agencies would be violating congressional intent
by promulgating and implementing one. Thus, a “clear statement” of the
post-departure bar would be necessary in the eyes of several circuits.407
Union Pacific also serves these three principles in reaching the same
result as the Chevron circuits. The first principle is met by use of judicial
power to force the EOIR to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent allowed
by Congress.408 Again, while this outcome results in more administrative,
as opposed to judicial, review the court is using judicial review as an
administrative decision in a manner that is beneficial to immigrants.
Additionally, Union Pacific serves the clear statement rule. In finding
that Congress clearly delegated power to hear these cases, the circuits lend
support to the rule. After all, if Congress had wanted to strip the circuits of

402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

See supra notes 217–34 and accompanying text; see also Part II.D–E.
See supra Part I.F.
See supra notes 222–40 and accompanying text; see also Part II.E.
See supra notes 222–40 and accompanying text; see also Part II.E.
See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 222–40 and accompanying text; see also Part II.D–E.
See supra Part II.D.
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their jurisdiction here, it would have clearly stated so.409 By requiring a
clear statement that such jurisdiction does not exist, the Union Pacific
circuits have enforced this norm in favor of immigrant rights.
Finally, the third principle is met by the holdings of the Union Pacific
circuits.
By blocking the BIA and IJs from shirking their own
congressionally-granted jurisdiction, removed aliens are given another shot
at possible reopening or reconsideration of an adverse ruling against
them.410 In this way, every opportunity to avoid the harsh consequences of
removal is explored.
These two bases can work together to properly dismantle the postdeparture bar forever. As these three principles have been reinforced by the
Supreme Court in the last decade,411 the recent majority of rulings at the
circuit level in favor of dismantling the bar also serve these trends, albeit
indirectly.412 In this way, our immigration adjudicative authorities can
properly serve both congressional intent and the rights of removed
immigrants.
CONCLUSION
The post-departure bar serves to prevent the filing of motions to reopen
or reconsider by aliens who have already been physically removed from the
United States.413 After years of standing unchallenged, the bar’s validity
has been questioned by multiple circuit courts in recent years.414
There are three main outcomes that the circuits have relied upon in ruling
on the bar’s validity. First, there is the use of Chevron analysis to dismantle
the bar.415 Second, there is the use of Chevron analysis to reach the
opposite conclusion that the bar should stand.416 Finally, the ruling in
Union Pacific has been cited for the principle that an agency such as the
EOIR cannot limit its own jurisdiction by refusing to hear a motion.417
When looking at the “scorecard” of circuit rulings, the majority of
circuits have decided to invalidate the post-departure bar.418 This trend
seems likely to continue because of three norms that are prevalent in recent
Supreme Court immigration cases: (1) the idea that administrative action
should be subject to judicial review, even in the immigration context;
(2) the “clear statement rule”; and (3) the idea that immigrants should have
every opportunity to fight the harsh consequences of removal.419
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See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part II.F.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part I.A–B.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 221–34 and accompanying text; see also Part II.A–E.
See supra notes 207–21 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part I.F.
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Ultimately, it does not matter whether circuits rely on Chevron or Union
Pacific to strike down the bar. Both sets of reasoning can operate to serve
the three norms above.420 Thus, the post-departure bar’s invalidation is
consistent with the direction of the rest of immigration law.421

420. See supra Part II.A–C.
421. See supra Part II.A–C.

